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1INTRODUCTION
1. Problem of the Thesis
The problem of this thesis is the investigation and
criticism of Hartmann* s theory of value as presented in his
Ethic s .
It is evident, when one considers the whole of the
Ethic
s
,
that Hartmann’s main concern is the dignity and sig-
nificance of man in a world which he believes to be com-
pletely mechanistic, and which is indifferent to those things
which man considers most important. His theory of value is
his attempt to orovide a satisfactory hypothesis as to the
nature of values and their relation to reality, with the
special aim of finding in this nature and relation a task for
man which he alone can do. If man alone, of all the onto-
logical beings
,
can perform a task so cosmically important
as the imparting of values to reality
,
then his sense of
dignity and significance is not a mere anthropocentric il-
lusion, but must be recognized by whatever cosmic powers
there may be.
Theory of value or axiology will be understood to mean,
throughout the thesis, a theory which attempts to answer
questions as to the nature of values
,
their relation to re-
ality, to real beings, and to each other.
To attempt to set a definition for value which would
hold throughout the thesis would presume upon the problem of
.*
.
2the thesis since just such definition is a part of value
theory. However, value may be understood to mean the qual-
ity (or qualities) of an object of a value judgment which causes
it to be desirable. Objects of value judgments may be
things, relations, persons, or personal dispositions. This
much can be said without prejudice to any definition Hartmann
might propose or assume. These qualities may be said to in-
here in objects, or in the nature of the subject, or in the
relation between the two, or, another possibility, they may
be independent of all these and enter into them only upon
the fulfillment of certain conditions..
To determine Hartmann's answers ’to these and related
problems, and to criticize them, is the aim of the thesis.
2. Previous Literature
Very little has been written in English concerning
Hartmann's theory of value, or for that matter, concerning
his Ethics . Following the publication of the work in German
in 1926, and then again following its publication in English
in 193P j a number of reviews appeared, together with some
articles on various aspects of Hartmann's thought. These
revews were, for the most part, short, superficial and un-
critical, shedding little or no light on the problem of the
thesis
.
Of the articles written regarding Hartmann's system,
/
four have some bearing on the present problem. Three of
..
»•
.
these appeared in the International Journal of ethics . The
first of these, written by Sidney Hook, appeared in 1930.^
O
The second, by Howard Eaton, was published in 1932, and
M. G. Walker's article comparing the theories of Hartmann
and Perry, in 1938.^ In addition to these articles, a
fourth was published in the Philosophical Review in 1939,
written by Roger Hazelton.^
Hook, in his article "A Critique of Ethical Realism”,
recognizes the importance of Hartmann's work as a contribu-
tion to ethical theory, but aays
,
in effect, that everything
is admirable about it except the viewpoint.
He condemns the efforts of those, who like Hartmann,
would establish an absolute, rigid valuational standard or
scale, when values are really fluctuating and dependent upon
the social situation in which the individual finds himself.
He holds the view that values are dependent upon the needs
of the subject and his society and scaled by their conse-
quences upon his welfare.
Although disagreeing with Hartmann's metaphysics, Hook
says that naturalist and absolutist alike can be grateful to
Hartmann for the detailed consideration which he gives to
specific ethical problems in his analysis of moral values.
Finally he disagrees with Hartmann's argument that free-
1. Hook, Art. (1930), 179-210.
2. Eaton, Art. (1932), 20-36.
3. Waiker, Art. (1938), 37-61.
4. Hazelton, Art. (1939), 621-632.
,t
.
dom must be assumed, even if it cannot be proven, to justify
the phenomenon of guilt and responsibility. Hook says that
these ohenomena could be subjectively based on dangerous il-
lusions which might be destructive rather than constructive
for man.
Eaton’s article on "The Unity of Axiological Ethics" is
mainly concerned with Hartmann's treatment of the problem of
freedom. He does, however, point out that Hartmann
t
takes explicitly the position which was only adum-
brated in the later work oi Meinong and which was
implicit in Scheler's ethics, namely, that our
emotional experiences provide us with an epistemo-
logical "organ", so to speak, co-ordinate with our
perceptions and judgments
,
equipped to report to
us not on facts but on values. 5
This "organ" is important for it enables the subject to
have knowledge of what is not yet, of values which *are un-
realized and hence could not be derived from experience.
Eaton argues that Hartmann is on the right track until
he tries to prove some form of freedom. Hartmann admits
that the subject as ontological being is determined, but re-
fuses to recognize that this determinism is complete, that
even when he pushes the choice of alternatives back to the
will, that the will itself is determined by some element,
which he cannot explain. Hartmann would establish the sub-
ject's freedom by his devotion to ends, but Eaton denies
this possibility. He argues that "the scientific minded
5. Eaton, Art. (1932), 26.
.*
.
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ethic ist .. .must abanion the concept of free will ...if he
won . d establish ethics as a science." Such complete
determinism and rejection of the idea of moral freedom
seems out of place in ethics where one of the basic postu-
lates is that man is guilty or responsible only in so far as
he is free.
Walker, in his article, “Perry and Hartmann: Antitheti-
cal or Complementary? " compares the value theories of Perry
and Hartmann, with
three startling results: First, many apparent dif-
ferences resolve themselves into contrasts of
terminology rather than meaning. Second, each of
the theories is marred by a failure to meet a
fundamental aspect oi the value situation which
can be satisfied only on the opposing view. Third,
each of the theories at some one point is led to
borrow silently, even unconsciously, from its oppo-
nent . 7
It certainly seems a startling result to find that the dif-
ference between a theory of value which says that values are
subsistent iaeal essences beyond and independent of con-
sciousness, ana one wnicn hoias that values are purely sub-
jective ana entirely dependent Upon the desires and inter-
ests of the subject, is largely one of terminology.
Walker aoes not mean to assert that the original point
of departure is the same. for the two theories, but that in
the working out of the further elements of them, that they
are quite similar in many respects. Both Perry ana Hartmann
6. Eaton, Art. (1932), pp.
7. Walker
,
Art. (1938), P7-38.
. . .
.
.
,
6hold that the world is mechanistic and indifferent to value
and that man alone can impart values to it. Only persons
are carriers of values. They also agree that moral conflict
grows out of the complex appeal of a great variety of goods
o
which clamor for man's attention and devotion.
Walker feels that Perry’s answer concerning: the nature
of values, that they are the objects of human interest, is
the only convincing answer. But Perry's subjective analysis
analyzes away the feeling of obligation of which Hartmann
takes due cognizance. Hartmann on the one hand,
neglects the essential relevance of the values to
the moral agent; the position of ethical subjecti-
vism [Perry's position] slights the fact of the
moral obligation.^
Taking the truth of each theory and combining them, one ar-
rives at a concept that is both subjective and objective.
Values are subjective in that they are objects of human in-
terest in their very being, but they are objective at least
in the sense that they are obligatory for the individual
will. 10
Hazelton' s article, "On Hartmann's Doctrine of Values
As Essences"
,
offers little of value on the problem. It is
mainly a clarification of Hartmann's concept of the ideal
being of values. Hazelton points out values as conceived by
Hartmann are universals which become effective as they are
particularized in the realm of Being. Hartmann's insistence
8. See Walker, Art. (1938), 60.
9. Walker, Art. ( 1938 >, 47.
10.
See Walker, Art. (1938), 60.

upon the materiality of value essences is regarded by him a3
a recognition of the fact that the alternatives and impera-
tives presented and felt in the ethical situation are always
specific and concrete.
^
In addition to these articles, a dissertation and a
thesis have been written at Boston University on certain
aspects of Hartmann's Ethic
s
.
The dissertation, written by David lino in 194-1, deals
specifically with Hartmann's criterion of value, sense of
value ( Wertgeftihl ) , and his rejection of a theistic world-
hypothesis. Yet a large portion of the material regarding
the sense of value is relevant to the problem of the thesis.
lino concludes after examining Hartmann's reasons for
the objectivity of values that the sense of value is his
sole empirical basis for such a view. Although Hartmann in-
sists that intuition alone guides one to the knowledge or
discernment of values, he himself is forced to employ a
synoptic criterion to distinguish mistakes in judgments of
values
.
Hartmann confuses values and ideals. On his view val-
ues as defined by Perry are never experienced. His chief
error, according to lino, consists in supposing that all
value experience is an intuitive beholding of eternal i-
deals
.
11. See Hazelton, Art. (1939), 629.
12. See lino, CHE, 44-140.
.
8The thesis, written by Richard Millard, Jr. in 194-2, is
a study of Hartmann’s concept of teleology. Certain parts
of it, too, are helpful in this investigation.-1--^
He, too, points out Hartmann's persistent confusion of
values and Ideals. He feels that there is really not so much
valuational conflict as Hartmann thinks, but that Hartmann
is confusing value-claims with true -values. Hartmann creates
some of his own difficulties in this way. But his recogni-
tion of the importance of human purpose is to be lauded. It
is doubtful, however
,
if it is enough to .justify placing man
on God's throne.
Ther . is much useful material contained in these
sources . They will be referred to frequently as this study
develops
.
3. Plan of the Thesis
Before it is possible to criticize any theory fairly and
intelligently, it is necessary to understand what is main-
tained in it. This means that it is necessary to consider
the whole of the theory before criticizing it. Therefore
the plan of this thesis will be to present the whole of Hart-
mann's theory of value before attempting any critical analysis
of its various parts.
The first chapter deals with the nature or values prior
13. See Millard, TNHE
,
14-40, 44-53, 58-73, i21-l45.
.*
.
.
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to their discernment by the subject, the means by which they
are discerned, and their relation to reality and its cate-
gories .
The second cnapter is a presentation of Hartmann's the-
ory of the way unrealized values become determinant for real
subjects who strive to realize them, finding their own per-
sonality and self-realization in the striving. Also included
in this chapter is Hartmann's doctrine of freedom.
In the third chapter, the attempt is made to evolve or
discover a scale or system of values using the sense of val-
ues which is the primary empirical basis for Hartmann's
entire value theory.
The fourth chapter is concerned with discovering the
basic p-oints of Hartmann's theory and criticizing them on
the basis of self-consistency, consistency with the facts of
all experience, and finally in relation to other alternative
views on the same problem.
The attempt is made throughout the entire thesis to
avoid quotations from other sources except where they either
make Hartmann's ooint more clear, or o^fer a more coherent
solution than Hartmann. The assumption has been that the
important matter is to get a clear idea of Hartmann's theory
and its validity.
..
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CHAPTER I
THE VALUE REALM
1. The Ideal Objectivity of Values
One of the basic questions to be considered in the con-
struction or development of a theory of value concerns the
ontological status of values. The differing answers given
to this question constitute ore of the basic divisions of eth-
ical thought, that of subjectivity or objectivity of values.
If values are purely constructs of the subject's conscious-
ness regarding some relation or object which is in some way
related to the subject, then values are subjective and rel-
ative to the valuations of the individual subject. Even if
these valuations are traced to the universal categorizing of
the reason, they are still subjective. On the other hand,
if values are inherent qualities of things and relations ex-
isting independent of, and prior to, their discovery by the
subject in empirical nature, then they are regarded as ob-
jective and absolute.
For Kant, all principles originated in the subject.
The objective manifold was formless and only received mean-
ing, shape, and order through the categorizing activity of
the mind. Therefore, when he sought to determine the nature
of ethical principles, it was only natural that he should
consider them to be of subjective origin. If ethical prin-
ciples were derived from the objective world of nature, they
..
*' '
.
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would lack the universality and autonomy necessary for moral
laws; but if they emanated from reason, they would be univer
sal and a priori, genuine commandments standing over against
ail natural laws, independent of, and suoerior to them.
Forced to choose between an empirical relativism and a tran-
scendental "subjectivism" (a subjectivism which is a' priori
and universal)
,
Kant chose the rationally based ethical
principles of a transcendental subjectivism.
Hartmann holds that Kant’s conclusion was reached by an
imperfect disjunction in the presentation of the argument.
Kant thought that ethical principles must be derived either
from nature or from reason.* He was right in thinking that
these principles must be known a priori, rather than derived
from the empirical presentation. The independence of specif
ic empirical data which is the substance of aprioristic in-
sight is needed, if ethics is to be based upon universal ra-
tional princioies. Kant, therefore, inferred that the sub-
ject acids this insight out' oi himself.
It is at tnis ooint that Hartmann claims Kant erred.
There is anoiher possible origin for a priori ethical' prin-
ciples, other than nature or reason. He says,
Must the subject himself create that which has been
added?... Is nop the reverse also possible? May not
the content of what the subject discerns a priori be
just as objective as what he perceives a posteriori?
That the aprioristic contents are not to be extract-
ed from the real ("empirical") objects as such does
not in any way derogate from their objectivity. Ge-
ometrical relations cannot indeed be derived from
.things, not even from drawn figures, but are best il-
lustrated by these; they are none the less on that

12
account something purely objective, something that
can be discerned as objects, and they have nothing
to do with the functions of consc iousness • . .And is
it otherwise with the categorical imperative? The
exacted harmony of the individual will with the I-
deal will of all can certainly never be extracted
from an empirical will. But from this, does it
follow that this requirement is a function, an act,
a legislation of reason? Evidently just as little.
It also is something purely objective; its content
is an ideal objective relation which precisely as
such, hovers before the moral consciousness, inde-
pendently of the degree of its actualization in
real life . 1
From all this, it is seen that universal, a priori ethical
principles need not be of subjective origin. Their only need
is not to have their source in a naturalistic objectivity.
This need is not based on an anti-empirical prejudice
but is actually a result of the requirements of the empirical
situation. Before one can Judge the value or disvalue of his
conduct, or of some relation or object, one must already have
knowledge of some standard by which the judgment may be made.
While it may be true that values are first discovered empir-
ically in some actual situation, this discovery only serves
to turn the attention of the ethic ist to the principle em-
bodied in the situation. It is the task of philosophical
ethics to bring to consciousness the ethical principles
which are already present in it. In this manner there is a
persistent elaboration of new principles. The valuing con-
sciousness perceives new values presented in new embodiments,
1. Hartmann, ETH, I, 163. In subsequent references to this
work, throughout the thesis, the author's name will usually
be omitted.
. C 4 , . : . '
.
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and shifts its gaze to that part of the value realm which
contains the values present therein. Values and principles,
however, do not change. They are timeless, unaffected by
their historical embodiment or lack of it, and equally un-
affected by the subject's consciousness of them. They are
riot recognized by the fact that they are, or are not, con-
tained in the real.
Demonstration of this super-temporal
,
super-historical
nature of values is sufficient proof of the Kantian error
and serves to establish an objective source of ethical prin-
ciples that is not naturalistic. There is
a self-existent ideal sphere in which values are
native, and... the contents of this sphere, values,
self-subs istent and dependent upon no experience,
are discerned a priori.
^
This is a part of the answer which Hartmann proposes to give
to the question concerning the nature of values. Continuing
in the same vein, he says
,
Valuational structures are ideal objects, beyond
all real Being and Not-Being, also beyond the really
existing fesling of value which alone grasps them. J
This form or mode of being is by no means a modern concept.
Plato, aware of another realm of being than that of existence
in reality and consciousness, named it the realm of the Idea,
while the Scholastics called it the realm of essentia . As a
result of the Kantian emohasis on subjectivism, this realm
was considered outmoded, but now the Phenomenologists have
2. E'TH
,
I, 165.
3. ETH, I, ISO.
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revived it as the realm of essence.
It is difficult to think what a thing must he like when
it is not existent either in reality or in thought
,
when it
neither is nor is not. It is such talk that causes the ama-
teur philosopher or the much discussed "man on the street" to
look askance at the philosopher and shake his heal signifi-
cantly. But values possess this ontological status of es-
sences; in their mode of Being they are Platonic ideas.
They belong to that further realm of Being which
Plato first discovered, the realm which we can
spiritually discern but cannot see or grasp...
they are that "though which" everything which par-
ticipates in them is exactly as it is--nameiy
valuable .. .Values emanate neither from things (or
real relationships) nor from the percipient. No
naturalism and no subjectivism attach to their
form of Being. Furthermore, they are not "formal"'
or empty structures, but possess contents; they
are "materials"
,
structures which constitute a
specific quality of things, relations or persons
according as they attach to them or are lacking.
Neither things nor consciousness emanate irom values.
Values form a separate and essentially unrelated group with-
in Being. Though always discerned in specific material em-
bodiments
,
they are yet unaffected either by existents or by
consciousness, the other factors in a given situation. Val-
ues are absolute and when found in a relational situation,
are neither contained in the relation nor derived from it.
The valuableness is different from any given struc-
ture and from every relation, although it inheres
in them; it is an ens sui generis
,
an essence of
another sort. C
4. ETH, I, lb5.
5. ETH, I, 217.
•*
.
•
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•
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While the subject may create or produce the relation in which
values inhere, he cannot produce the values. Values are
relative only in the sense that the subject may strive to
relate them to the relations of which he is a part. But the
values confront him as something independent, with an exist-
ence or being and energy of their own. As such they are self-
existent . They
subsist independently of the consciousness of
them. Consciousness can grasp or miss’ them, but
cannot make or spontaneously decree them.
6
It is not to be thought, however, that values are real exist-
ents. As discovered inherent in materials or relations, in
goods, or any other form in which value may be found, they
may participate in determining reality and may even themselves
be actualized. But their essence, their mode of Being al-
ways remains ideal.
These values, as such, in comparison with the ac-
tual, always have the character of an "idea", which
indeed, when the actual corresponds with it, lends
to this the character of a value, but which with
its ideal nature still remains on the other side
of actualization.
7
Values may so Inhere in an existent relation or object as to
lend it the aspect of valuableness. But this is only an ap-
parent relation, for the values are always ideal, and the ma-
terial to which they are attached is that which is actualiz-
ed.
From the foregoing it may be seen that Hartmann answers
6. ETH, I, 218.
7. ETH, I, 221.
..
. 3
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the question concerning the ontological status or nature of
values by declaring them to be ideal self-existents
,
inde-
pendent alike of relation to reality or to conscious aware-
ness. When discerned in actual, concrete situations, they
are visitors from another realm, never losing their alien
characteristics, always retaining their ideality, their cit-
izenship in another world. This other world, the natural a-
bode of values, is the realm of subsistent metaphysical
essences, where logical and mathematical essences, indeed all
essences, share ideal objectivity.
These essences only inhere in actual relations or ob-
jects when discerned or "invited" by an actual being. All
their appearances are guest appearances. So tong as some
actual being is aware of them they may continue to lend the
richness of their essences to this realm of actuality.
The concept of ideal objectivity or self-existence is
difficult for unsophisticated thought which is prone to re-
gard real actuality alone as self-existent. Two prejudices
are largely responsible for this view.
In the first place actuality and Being are
falsely identified—although the circle of the
"actual" need not be limited to things . Every-
thing that is not actual then belongs without
further ado to Not-Being. And, unless one under-
stands this in the Platonic sense as Being of
another kind, one can understand it only to mean
nothingness
.
Secondly, however
,
ideality is mistaken for
sub jectivity--a confusion for which the double
meaning of the term "idea" is to blame. When "idea"
is taken as the equivalent of "presentation"
,
ideality becomes the mode of Being of whatever

17
subsists only in and for the presentation of a
subject; but beyond that it is meaningless .. .with
this meaning anR ideal sphere' can naturally have no
self-existence .
°
If one will consider these misuses of "idea", it will be
easier to think ideal existence meaningfully, as existence in
a realm of essence. One will not be so prone to deny it be-
cause one does not see it. If it is unseen, the fault lies
with the subject and not with the object, for
there is a realm of values subsisting for itself...
beyond reality just as much as beyond consciousness.
An ethical ideal sphere, not manufactured, invented,
or dreamed, but actually existing and capable of be-
ing grasped in the phenomenon of the feeling for
values .
9
This realm of metaphysical essences, beyond nature and con-
sciousness, is the other possible source of objectivity
which Kant fails to consider. It affords the universal, a
priori objectivity which he sought. It is not a natural
objectivity but an ideal objectivity in the realm of essence.
This realm is the source of all genuine ethical principles as
well as all values or principles derived from them. Here all
values, moral-values, goods-values
,
s ituat ional-values , await
discovery
.
2 . How Values Are Known
Once the value-theorist determines the ontological na-
ture of values, he is confronted with an epistemological
problem. How are such values to be known?
8. ETH, I, 222.
9. ETH, I, 226.
'i
•
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In the foregoing: discussion of the ideal objectivity of
values, it was seen that Hartmann regards values as self-
subsistent, ideal essences independent of real existence or
conscious awareness. They
are not to be discovered in the conduct of man.
On the contrary, one must already have knowledge
of them in order to distinguish whether his con-
duct accords with them or violates them . 1- 0
Hence, an investigation of the ethical principles and prac-
tices of man will not reveal the valuational criterion al-
though an investigation of his valuational intuitions will
yield much information regarding it. Such a criterion must
already be known to the investigator if he is to judge the
value or disvalue of past human conduct or principles. He
must possess beforehand the ability to evaluate the things
and relations which he finds.
This would seem to suggest the Kantian hypothesis of a
categorizing subject which shapes and labels the phenomena
presented to it. But Hartmann has already rejected this
subjectivism by establishing values as self-existent and in-
dependent of conscious activity. They are not produced by
thought, nor are they derived by reflection on the facts com-
piled or observed by students of the phenomena. Even this
secondary, philosophical knowledge of values is never obtain-
ed from facts alone. Far from being subjective, values "are
not even capable of being directly grasped by thought."
Hartmann has thus rejected both the rational thought
10. ETH, I, 99.
11. ETH, I, 185.
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and the moral conduct of men as possible sources for knowl-
edge of values. The values are apparently shut up in their
realm and the subject in his with all gates between closed.
However, Hartmann, delving more deeply into human experience,
discovers that there are empirical ethical phenomena other
than the acts and dispositions of men. This ethical other
is the feeling or sensing of values which precedes and ac-
companies the acts and dispositions of the subject, condemn-
ing or Justifying them. This feeling of vaiues does judge
the goodness or badness of the attitudes and conduct of the
subject. It does apparently possess the criterion by which
to judge the value or disvalue of the things and relations
of real existence. Such a feeling for values is a fact of
human experience. However,
it is never found in the actual conduct of man,
nor in the actual adjustments and historical phe-
nomena of human society, but simply and alone in
the primary consciousness of good and evil itself. 12
While one may travel the world over and amass and study great
volumes of sociological information concerning historic and
pre-hlstoric man, and never discover the means by which val-
ues are known and valuations made, the secret is always with
one, immediately at hand in the intuitive capacity to know
and appreciate the valuable. All
comprehension of ethical reality--whether it con-
sist of goods, human relations or demands for a
personal dec is ion-- is always, even for the naivest
12. E'TH
,
I, 101.
..
.
.
.
.
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consciousness, transfused with valuations, with
preferences in accordance with feeling, with strong
tensions for or against. 13
These valuational preference- are not cognitive acts
preceded by judgments of the understanding, but are intui-
tively and immediately present in the grasping of the given
circumstance. These emotional oreferences penetrate all of
reality, lending to everything which falls into the subject's
vision the mark of value or disvalue . As a result the ethi-
cist may first discover the princioles which he seeks through
perception of them in some concrete embodiment in life, but
even here the knowledge of the principle is a priori and intu-
itive, independent or the” actual situation which served as a
guide to the principle. This use of actual phenomena is only
a roundabout way to arrive at aprioristic insight. The in-
quiry of the ethicist
rests uoon the primal feeling of value, and can ao
nothing except draw out from the total emotional
phenomenon the aprioristic content which was al-
ready within it. The primary seat of the valu-
ational a priori is the valuational feeling itself
which pervades our interpretation of reality and
our attitude toward life.^
Insight into values is always a priori, whether it is this
primary feeling of value or the knowledge derived by the re-
flective investigation of the ethicist.
The knowledge derived by study of the phenomena of val-
uational feeling may lead to the formulation of laws or prin-
13. ETH, I, 176-177.
14. ETH, I, 178.
.,
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clples of the realm of values. This formulation Is desirable
and indeed necessary for the better understanding of this
ideal realm. It must not be forgotten, however, that the
original "feeling of value” is that and nothing more. The
principle is a secondary phase in the study of values. This
is a significant point for the student of ethical phenomena.
His investigations cannot go beyond the living sense of val-
ues. The consciousness of value must lead the way into the
unknown vastness of the value realm.
The studies of the ethicist have a practical value as
well as a theoretical one. The living sense of value af any
one group or society may and does discern new sections of
the value manifold. As the group feeling for value thus
shifts its attention to new values, the other value would
vanish from sight were it not for the work of the ethicist
who uses the value consciousness of men and societies past
and present in an unending endeavor to chart the value realm.
Each shift of attention adds to his information regarding the
value sphere. And this information may then be used by man
as he seeks to systematize values in order to make wiser and
better choices when values compete for his attention and de-
votion.
To make the nature of the consciousness of value more
clear, Hartmann says,
that which we call conscience is at bottom just this
primal consciousness of value, which is found in the
feeling of every person... The well-known way in
which "conscience" expresses Itself fits most exactly
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the emotional consciousness
,
the obscure, half-con-
scious sense of value, which speaks unsummoned and
does not reveal its inner content. The so-called
"voice of conscience" is oerhaps the most elemental
way in which the sense of value grains currency
among men. 15
Coming as it does, uncalled for, unannounced, even unwanted,
it opens the door to a nigher power from another world--the
ideal realm of values. Conscience makes known the manifes-
tation of iaeal beings, values, in the reality of human life.
Values, in their ideal objectivity, "are then the ’condition
1
c.
of possibility' of conscience."
The phenomenon of conscience thus serves a twofold pur-
pose. It is a form of the intuitional consciousness of value,
and it is clear evidence of the objective actuality of val-
ues. Standing as judge of the subject it disproves any last
claim to validity which subjectivism might have.
Hartmann has answered two of the basic questions of
value-theory, namely, What is the ontological status of val-
ues? and How are values known? Values are ideal essences
,
self-es istent
,
subsisting beyond Being and Not-Being, inde-
pendent of, and unaffected by, reality or consciousness, yet
known to consciousness as inherent in real existence through
an intuitive, a priori discernment or feeling of their pres-
ence .
15. ETH, I, 200-201.
16. ETH, I, 202.
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3. The Relation of Values to Reality
Values are ideal essences. As such they are independent
of reality or real existents. But like all forms of ideal
Being, they have some relation to reality. This relation
exists in an area of agreement where the two spheres overlap.
In this area of coincidence the ideal principles become cat-
egories or laws of real existence. While the spheres of
ideality and reality may extend far beyond this area of co-
incidence, it is only the ideality contained in this area
which is of significant and pressing interest for a real sub-
ject. Even if theoretical interest in the content of the i-
deal realm were to urge the subject on to further study of
it, he would be limited to this real embodiment of the ideal
principle for data to study. Thus the limit would still be
that of the coincident areas.
With values this situation is altered. The relation
between values and reality differs in two significant ways
from the relation between reality and other ideal essences.
The first of these differences has to do with the nature and
power of the ideal in its real manifestation, when "actual-
ized". Logical or mathematical essences, when actualized
become categories or principles of real existence. As such,
they are universal and necessary ways in which real existents
and subjects act or are acted upon. Values, however, are not
categories of the real. It is true that there is an area of
interpenetration in which there is agreement between the
...
• :
•
%
.
\
-
.
.
.
.
.
,
.
24
ideal ethical sphere and the real ethical sphere. In tnis
area values may inhere in reality, may be actualized. Eut
here the difference appears. "Over against' the real they
signify only a claim, an Ought-to-Be, no inevitable necessi-
ty, no real compulsion . "
^
Whereas other ideal principles,
when actualized, become determinant for reality, values must
await the determinations oi real subjects. The subject is
not subordinate to tnem. They can press their claim to ac-
tuality ana authority only through some form of tine sense of
value previously discussed. But the will of the subject can
counteract the consciousness of value or ti^e voice of con-
science.
This dependence of values upon the subject is the first
important difference between the relation of values and reality,
and other ideal forms and reality. While the other ideal
%
forms when coincident with reality are cate'gor ically deter-
minant for real existents
,
values when thus coincident are
only conditionally determinant principles. The condition is
their acceptance by a real subject.
The second difference between values and other ideal
essences in relation to reality has to do with the extent of
significant influence over the real possessed by the ideal
form. For the other essences, this influence is quite strong,
but is limited to the area in which the two spheres overlap
and the ideal is actualized. Values, on the contrary, are
relatively weak as actual determinants, but their influence
17. STH, I, 96.
_
25
transcends the limitations of coincidence of the two spheres.
By this transcendence, values which are not contained in the
area where the two spheres are coincident, and which are not
actualized, submit their claim to reality. It is in the na-
ture of values to tend toward reality and this tendency ex-
presses Itself as an ideal "Ought-to-Be" whether the value is
actualized or not. This "claim holds good, even where it is
not, indeed even where it cannot be carried out." 1 ^
This tendential Ought attaching to values is the out-
reach of the ideal ethical realm and expresses Itself as a
sanction of real situations and objects in which values in-
here. They are just as they ought to be. When values do not
inhere in reality, indeed when reality contradicts their Be-
ing, then the ideal Ought-to-Be becomes a positive Ought-to-
Be'.
Ethical ideal self-existence is not indifferent to
the ethical reality which contradicts it; it fixes
the contradiction as a relation of opposition and
strain, and denies the real which contradicts it,
however well founded this may be ontologically
;
it stamps it as contradictory to value and sets
against it the idea of its own proper structure. ^-9
This contradiction and condemnation of reality by values cre-
ates a state of tension, marks the real as something which
Ought-Not-to-Be
,
and proclaims the unactualized values alone
as what Ought-to-Be. As a positive Ought-to-Be opposed to
what Is, the unactualized value becomes a dynamic potential
18. ETH, I, 98.
19. ETH, I, 233.
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capable of opposing the force of real categories and making
them serve its own ends.
Values thus tend
to shape in higher fashion the categorial world
already formed, supplementing this by their high-
est structures, personal entities, and building it
up according to their own pattern, the pattern of
the ideal essences.^
When the discerning subject wills to correct the situation
in accordance with the claim of the discerned values, then
these values, despite their conditional deterrainacy, prove
more efficient than are the categories of Being. For values
are creative principles, capable of transforming ideality in-
to reality, Not-Being into Being. This transformation is ef-
fected by the Ought which attaches to every value and clamors
for realization through the agency of the discerning subject.
In discussing the ideal objectivity of values, no mention
was made of any Ought attached to them. The Ought only be-
comes evident when the relation to the values and reality is
considered for it is an Ought-to-Be
,
and values as ideal es-
sences are beyond Being and Not-Being. It must be made clear
however, that "the Ought belongs to the essence of the value
and must be already contained in its ideal mode of exist-
ence." 21 As regards Being, the ideal Ought-to-Be is the prop-
er mode of Being of value, and the value is the content of the
Ought. Because a value is self-existent, it does not follow
that it is a moral obligation for some real subject. It does
20. ETH, I, 241.
21. ETH, I, 247.
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mean, however, that it should be actualized, it ought to "Be"
Thus universal peace ought to "Be" . This does not mean
that peace is or may be, but only that it is valuable and
should be actualized. Such an Ought-to-Be attaches to every
value, and is independent of Being and Not-Being. It in-
cludes, however, the tendency toward reality, and condemns
reality in which it is not realized.
The positive Ought-to-Be is a result of the transcend-
ence of the area of agreement of the ideal and real spheres
by values. The tension created by the non-agreement of the
two spheres is precisely the actuality of this positive
Ought-to-Be. Thus while the ideal Ought-to-Be attaches to
values independently of opposition or reality, the positive
Ought-to-Be can attach to values only in relation to their
non-existence in a real world.
Here the preliminary definition of the value realm
ends. Values, as self-existent ideal essences, are known to
real subjects intuitively through a "sense of value". They
subsist independently of their actualization in reality, but
exhibit a tendency to be actualized. This tendency to "Be"
attaches to all values as an ideal Ought-to-Be. When ideal-
ity is opposed by reality, this ideal Ought-to-Be becomes a
positive Ought-to-Be which gains in strength as the tension
between the two spheres increases. Thus the ideal reaim of
values is related to reality in' one of two ways. Either it
is related to reality by values inherent in reality and

actualized as other ideal forms or it is related to reality
in a relation of opoosition by values which do not inhere in
reality but rather contradict it.
The task of this chapter has been to determine the gen-
eral nature of the value realm in Hartmann's theory of value.
Later it will be necessary and desirable to investigate more
thoroughly the nature of this realm. But the next task is
to continue the work begun here and determine how values op-
posed by the categories and existents of reality may yet be
actualized
.
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CHAPTER II
VALUE REALIZATION
1. Finalistic and Causal Determination
In the previous chapter values were depicted as inde-
pendent of reality, yet capable, to a certain extent, of en-
tering into it and reshaping it, building it according to
their own ideal pattern. This redirection of the processes
of reality is not accomplished by the direct action of the
values themselves
,
but through the activity of a mediating
subject who discerns that these values ought to be, sets them
up as ends, and purposefully strives to realize them.
It is one thing to attribute such powers or influence
to values and to real subjects, and quite a different thing
to explain how a real existent, subject to the causal deter-
mination of the real world, can so effectively pursue non-
real ends as to alter the course of the real. Man the real
subject who thus' pursues ends is as much enmeshed in the
chain of events constituting the causal nexus as any other
real being. He is "from the start yoked to this texture,
outwardly and inwardly. As an ontological being (a natural
entity) he is throughout determined."-*- The teleological
subject X s , as real existent, causally determined, therefore
his actions are the consequent effects of antecedent causes.
1. ETH, I, 297.
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The causal nexus, by its very nature, cannot be broken, or
even temporarily suspended. It must be an unbroken series.
How then can man introduce a new determinant, how initiate
a series intended to realize ideal ends? This is precisely
the problem of the causal antinomy of Kant, the antinomy of
necessity and freedom, and although Hartmann thoroughly dis-
agrees with the "methodological drapery" of the Kantian
solution, he believes that Kant's treatment of the problem
is essentially correct. When stripped of its idealistic
trappings it is tremendously significant for the solution
of the antinomy.
The essential elements of the Kantian solution are two:
"the categorial concept of the causal nexus and the double
stratification of the world."
2
The first of these clearly
sets forth the universal and necessary nature of the laws
operative in the causal nexus. It was evident, therefore,
that no solution of the problem would be forthcoming if free-
dom were defined in the negative sense as independence of, or
freedom from, the determination of causality. Rather must
freedom be defined in the positive sense as the operation of
an additional determinant, a "determinant which is itself
not contained in the causal course of the world. "5 Hence,
for the subject to pursue his own ends, for flnalistic deter-
mination to alter the course of real events, the causal
2. STH, III
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nexus of the real world must be so constructed as to permit
the interpolation of a finalistic nexus into it without its
being disrupted.
The essential thing here is simply to demonstrate
that in the causal nexus there is room for a
unique determination which is not causal in its
origin. This would not happen at the expense of
the causal nexus. The general causal interlace-
ment within the cosmic process must go on unin-
terrupted.^
\
The only condition under which the entrance of a new, non-
causal determinant could be possible would be one in which
the subject determined was not only a natural entity, but
was also, in some way, participating in a second realm with
laws of its own. This is the other important essential of
the Kantian solution, the double stratification of the world.
Disregarding all the metaphysical definitions used by Kant,
the important point is that
there are in general two layers
,
two orders of
conformity, two kinds of determination in the one
world, the world in which man exists, and that
both manifest themselves in man himself. For if
the one layer is entirely determined causally,
there is need of a second layer, in order that out
of it heterogeneous determinants may be projected
into the causal nexus.
5
For Kant, this second layer was an intelligible world where
reason reigned supreme
,
and man as a rational being felt its
determination as the moral law. Although still causally
determined, man was positively free because he could add his
4. ETH, III, 55.
5. ETH, III, 58.
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own determination to the existing causal determination. Ac-
cepting the determination of the moral law in preference to
that of the causal nexus, man was self-determined, was free.
The moral law was an imperative, an Ought. Unlike
causal determination, it was- only a claim upon the subject.
But
the peculiarity of man's moral being is that among
the "motives" which inwardly determine him, this
claim, purely as such, can weigh very heavily in
the scales.
°
The influence of the Ought upon actual conduct is an empiri-
cal ethical fact and even when it is disregarded is still
seen as the criterion by which acts are judged. When heeded,
this Ought, through the subject, can intervene in and alter
the course of real events.
Hartmann does not agree that this intervening determi-
nant proceeds from the real, intelligible world into the
phenomenal world through the agency of reason. This is the
"methodological drapery" of the Kantian solution to which he
objects. According to Hartmann, the Ought originates in the
re$.lm of values and enters the real world via the intuitive
discernment of the subject. But this difference as regards
the nature of moral principles does not prevent his accept-
ance of the achievements of the Kantian doctrine of freedom
as the addition of a new determination in a world causally
determined throughout. These achievements are:
6. ETH, III, 60.
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first
,
a demonstration of the fact that there is
a power in the moral Ought
,
which as a heteroge-
neous
,
non-causal, determining factor, strikes
into the nexus of causal trends, and secondly, a
demonstration that the structure of the causal
nexus makes such an intervention possible, with-
out any interruption to it self.
7
Thus Kant's solution of the causal antinomy provides Hart-
mann with the answer to the problem of how finalist ic deter-
mination can enter into the causal nexus.
But this solution is not the whole of Kant's contribu-
tion to the problem. By his success, he exposed the falsity
of other theories regarding freedom. The errors contained,
in these false theories were all the results of overemphasis
on some aspect of the problem.
The most natural of these theories is that which empha-
sized the causal determination to the extreme. Observing
the universality and necessity of the causal nexus, in the
physical reaim, proponents of this theory concluded that it
was operative in the spiritual and mental worlds also. Every
act of man, even his resolutions, dispositions, and prefer-
ences, were attributed to the action of causal factors. In
this theory, no freedom was possible, not even positive free-
dom. While such a theory might conceivably be true, it fails
to account for the experiences of guilt and of choice which
are actual ethical phenomena. The individual does feel free,
and until this feeling can be satisfactorily accounted for,
7. ETH, III, 60
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the extension of the causal nexus to include all or man's
acts will be a highly questionable procedure.
Others, who studied the problem of freedom and were
equally impressed by the dominance of causality, were certain
that man must be free if he is to be a moral being. Conse-
quently, they sought refuge in a theory of indeterminism.
Thus while the causal process was determinant, it contained
occasional gaps, in which it was indeterminate. It present-
ed alternatives from which the individual could choose.
Once chosen, the causal process took over and controlled the
remainder of the action. By such a theory it was hoped that
both the fact of causal determination and the phenomenon of
freedom could be accounted for.
Still other thinkers were interested and impressed by
the experience of purpose in feeling and action. They felt
that their conduct was dominated by the ends which they de-
sired. Following the example of the causelists, they reason-
ed that the same sort of motivation must be the cause of all
activity, and extended teleological determinism over all
reality. All of reality was moving toward a final end, and
this end dictated the means by which the end was to be a-
chieved
.
One-sided, monistic theories, such as those of causal
or teleological determinism, which would establish one or
the other of these determinisms as supreme, destroy the pos-
sibility of man's moral freedom.
Both causal and finalistic determination, when
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taken in the absolute sense, that Is when monisti-
cally applied to the whole cosmic structure, com-
mit exactly the same blunder although in the oppo-
site direction. Both reduce the world to uniform-
ity; they give it a type of relational simplicity,
which excludes freedom. A universalized causal
determinism converts man into a mere natural enti-
ty, it degrades him; a universalized finalistic
determinism transforms Nature into a being that is
directed to ends, into such a being as man is...
Both theories reduce everything to a common denom-
inator. They thereby nullify the uniqueness of
Moral Being in the world. And again they thereby
extinguish man* s freedom.®
On either of these views, man is nothing more than an in-
strument by means of which the cosmic process is continued.
On the one hand, his conduct is determined by the push of
prior events; on the other, it is determined by the pull or
attraction of the destined end. In either case man can in-
troduce nothing out of himself which will cause an alteration
in the course of events. He is not free to initiate a new
series. Such "freedom is only possible where, in one world,
at least two types of determination are superimposed one up-
on the other." 9 The error of causal and finalistic determin-
isms is not determinism itself, but deterministic monism,
granting of exclusive supremacy to one type of determinism.
True freedom is possible only where two or more determina-
tions are operative in the same world.
This fact is the finishing blow for indeterminism.
There is no question of a minimum of determination, but of a
8. ETH, III, 75
9. ETH, III, 64
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maximum. In an undetermined world, freedom would be meaning-
less for it has meaning only in so far as it gives to its
possessor the power to effectively strive to realize his own
purposes. Without the uninterrupted operation of the causal
nexus, it would not be possible for man to know what to do
to realize the ends he has selected from the value realm.
Kant’s treatment of the problem of necessity and freedom
is thus doubly significant and valuable in that it not only
solves the problem, but also exposes the errors of other so-
called solutions. It Is a coherent solution in which the
data of both the physical and moral worlds are merged with-
out being lost. Man is free because of an excess of deter-
mination, not a minimum of it. To be positively free, he
must be determined on two sides, must be caught in a struggle
between the two orders, the causal and the finalistic
,
for
dominance. Only so long as this struggle continues can there
be freedom.
Kant described the metaphysical structure necessary for
man, or some other such natural entity, to be completely
determined causally, yet initiate new, non-causal series of
events. The basis of it all is that there must exist "a
metaphysical dualism of determinations which runs throughout
the cosmic structure and becomes visible in the ethos of
man."l° These requirements are met in Hartmann's theory.
10. ETH, III, 86.
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He, too, recognizes the determination of the causal
nexus
,
and with it a second determination superimposed upon
the causal nexus and rendered empirically observable only in
the moral conduct of man.
Indeed, Hartmann goes on to say that in truth the whole
is not a deterministic dualism, but a pluralism. The an-
tinomy between the causal and finalistic nexuses is really
not as glaring as it seems at first, for in contrasting the
two, several intermediate types of determination are over-
leaped. The laws or procedures of these intermediate types,
such as organic and psychological determination, are still
largely unknown. However, enough is known about them to as-
sure their existence. Other determinations, more elemental
even than causal determination are known, such as mathemati-
cal determination. Probably other determinations, yet un-
known, exist above the finalistic, for every stratum of being
has its own particular determination.
But it is not necessary to know all of the different
determinations to discover the basic law governing the entire
determinative structure. This is the twofold law of strength
and freedom and holds sway wherever one or more strata are
superimposed one upon another. By this law, each stratum of
determination is dependent for its very existence upon the
whole series of strata beneath it.
There is accordingly no personality, no teleology
without consciousness; no consciousness without
organic life; no organic life without a causal
structure of nature (mechanism in the wide sense)
;
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no causal mechanism without mathematical order; no
mathematical entity without the ontologically pri-
mal and basic relations.
H
Hence, the lower strata are the stronger, the more elemental,
the more generally applicable. This dependence of the higher
upon the lower strata is Irreversible and forbids teleologi-
cal determinism on a cosmic scale because such cosmic tele-
ology would be an inversion of this basic categorial law.
This dependence of the higher upon the lower strata has
a second important aspect. Though the higher stratum cannot
be without the lower, it is never determined by it. The low-
er is only material for the development of the higher. The
higher stratum is free to expand and develop its own individ-
ual nature, limited only by the limits of the material with
which it works, l.e. the lower strata.
It can of course achieve nothing contrary to the
lower, but it can achieve everything with it and
through it—but this only means that the lower is
the stronger. 12
Despite its inferior strength and material dependence, the
higher stratum is autonomous and free.
Then moral freedom, the freedom to pursue ends, is no
strange phenomenon but only a special case of the general
categorial freedom which appears from stratum to stratum.
The lower freedoms are no less significant, but man stresses
this particular freedom because it is the only basis of his
11. ETH, III, 92.
12. ETH, III, 94.
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ethical being.
Hartmann has much more to say on the problem of teleol-
ogy and freeuom. It is evident from the detailed treatment
which he gives this problem, that he considers it the crucial
point of the entire sphere. While it would be Interesting
to follow his treatment of the problem further, and the
temptation to do so is strong, it is necessary for the pur-
poses of the present study to return to matters more closely
related to Hartmann's theory of value. Those who wish to
learn more of Hartmann's doctrine of freedom and his treat-
ment of teleology, both human and cosmic, will find an ex-
cellent study of these matters in a thesis by Richard Millard,
Jr., written for Boston University in 1942. 13
The purpose of this section was to determine how the
finalist ic nexus could be introduced into the causal nexus
in such a way as to enable a real existent, man, to strive for
his own ends. It was Kant's contribution to show that such
freedom was possible given a second, non-causal determination
(like the finalistic determination) in addition to, but not
contrary to, the primal determination. Hartmann's analysis
of the relations of categorial strata shows that freedom of
the higher, superimposed strata from the determination of the
lower strata is a normal characteristic of the categorial
structure. While the finalistic nexus is dependent upon the
13. Millard, TNHE.
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causal, and cannot exceed its limits, it is freed from its
determination in accordance with the basic categorial law of
strength and freedom. Thus it is ontologically possible for
values, established as ends by the subject, to become deter-
minant in the real world despite the universality and neces-
sity of the causal nexus.
2. The Ought-to-Be and Value Realization
In the previous chapter, it was seen that an ideal
Ought-to-Be attaches to the ideal essence of every value.
This ideal Ought-to-Be approves or condemns real existence
in accord with the degree to which values are or are not re-
alized in it. This judgment is detached from reality, is
purely ideal. But when reality is contradictory to ideality,
the ideal Cught-to-Be issues forth from the ideal realm and
extends itself to the real as a positive Ought-to-Be.
In itself the real sphere does not oppose or favor the
realization of values. The real sphere, the causal nexus,
and the other lower strata of determination, are material
for the higher, finalistic determination. For its part, re-
ality is passive and indifferent as regards value realization.
It is as independent of values as values, in their self-ex-
istence, are of reality.
Since values are not actively opposed by the determina-
» i
tion of real categories, it would seem that they would ex-
perience no difficulty in becoming realized. But values,
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for all their tendency toward realization, and their freedom
to enter into the course of the real, have no power over it.
It is one of the limitations of their ideality that they can
only enter into and affect the real world as they are dis-
cerned and desired by a real existent entity.
The positive Ought-to-Be is the expression of the tend-
ency of the unrealized values to become realized, and occu-
pies a position midway between the ideal and real spheres
.
It is a product of the tension between the two spheres. Be-
yond this point vaLues are powerless to penetrate until they
are discerned by some real subject.
In the stream of real existence in fluctuating re-
ality itself, there must be a point of support,
upon which the Ought-to-Be impinges. There must be
a something or other within the real course of the
world which is added to the world as a member of
it and is dependent upon its universal conditions:
it must come under the laws of the real world,
share completely in the world's existential mode
of coming into being and vanishing, it must be a
thing that passes away like the world's other forms.
And yet it must at the same time be able to be a
carrier of the imperishable, the ideal; it must in
this one connection be more than the other forms,
distinguished from all other reality by an essential
feature, able to act in a manner different from
the rest of the real world. In short, there must
be a form capable of intent in the midst of blind
events
,
itself brought forth and borne along by
them and yet, amidst them, powerful in self-activ-
ity.14
For the positive Ought-to-Be to become a real determinant,
there must exist a real subject with two qualifications;
sensitivity to the Ought-to-Be of values, and ability to dl-
14. ETH, I, 256
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rect and control real events. It must be a real existent
wholly under the laws of actuality like the other existents
,
yet at the same time differing from them by virtue of its
consciousness of another world, the ideal realm of values.
The only real subject which is known to possess these
qualifications is man. He is capable of purposive self-ac-
tivity, and is responsive to the call of the ideal. While
participating in the real world, he is able to reflect with-
in himself another world, the world of ideal essences. When
the real world in which he participates contradicts the i-
deal world of which he is made conscious by his feeling of
value, then the positive Ought-to-Be enters into reality.
It seizes upon him and proclaims the unrealized values of
Being. It is still powerless to determine anything in real-
ity. The Ought can become a real determinant only as it wins
the support of the subject for its own aims. Through the
activity of this alien being, the Ought may overcome the re-
sistance of the real and the values to which it attaches be
realized.
When the positive Ought-to-Be, by means of its discern-
ment by the subject, enters the consciousness of a real enti-
ty, it becomes a value-concept. It exists in the conscious-
ness of the subject as knowledge of something which Ought-to-
Be. This part of the a priori discernment of values is not
exemplified in the phenomenon of conscienca. At this stage
no guilt or personal obligation attaches to the value dis-
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cerned. The subject has merely recognized the non-existence
of the discerned value and the desirability or "valuableness"
of such a value if it did exist. Thus, when the concept of
universal peace enters the subject's consciousness, it may
appear eminently desirable and yet so far beyond any seeming
possibility of being realized as to negate any active re-
sponse the subject might be moved to make. Mere recognition
that a value Ought-to-Be does not constitute an Imperative
Ought -to- Do
.
A place for that is not possible until someone is
in need of the goods and someone can acquire them
by effort... I ought to do what ought to be, in so
far as it "is" not, and in so far as to make it
actual is in my power. 15
The Ought-to-Be which is beyond the subject's powers then
does not obligate him in anyway. He chooses his ends in ac-
cordance with his need. and ability.
Value realization is not only limited by the subject's
ability to discern them but are further limited by the power
of the subject's will to refuse to acknowledge the Ought.
There is no compulsion in it. When it becomes possible for
the subject to do something about peace, he may deny the ob-
ligation of the Ought-to-Be which it is in his power to cause
to Be
.
Thus it is evident that "the attitude of the subject to
the Ought is the central point in the ethical problem. "16
15. ETH, I, 248.
16. ETH, I, 261.
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The entire process of value realization is dependent upon it.
Without the co-operative, purposive activity of the subject
in their behalf, values must remain unrealized. Since the
subject's striving is the result of the attractive power of
values presented through the primal feeling of value, all
such practical intent and activity, all realization of values,
is dependent upon the self-existence of the values. But for
them to be realized, for the journey from ideality to real-
ity to be completed, a real subject must affirm them in con-
trast to what "is" and, having done so, must strive to make
them real.
Through such affirmation and striving finalistic deter-
mination enters into the real world. When the subject dis-
cerns a value which Ought-to-Be and which needs to be and
possibly can be realized in his world, he sets this up as an
end. As a desired goal, it is at the same time
power and a directional point. As something sub-
stantial it does not impel the process from behind
and push it forward, but draws it to it self. ^7
In this sense, the finalistic nexus is the reverse of the
causal. In the causal process, the later occurrences are
always determined by the earlier, while in the finalistic
process, the end, the later occurrence determines the earli-
er occurrences which make it possible. While
the dynamic of the causal series is that of a
blind forward push. ..the dynamic of the final-
17. ETH, I, 273
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Istic series is the attraction issuing from the
final end. The prior existence of the end is the
condition of the whole.
This prior existence of the end is not to be taken as iden-
tical with the ideal self-existence of all values. Once the
values have been discerned, all subsequent activity, the
selection as ends and the striving to make real, is wholly
within the real structure.
The end can only exist, prior to its realization, as an
anticipated result of the subject's activity. When the sub-
ject sets up the end in his consciousness, he thus transcends
time. In his consciousness, he escapes the limitations of
time and dwells momentarily in the future. Then, beginning
at the end, step by step, he determines what the antecedent
step must be, tracing the course of the end realization back
to the present. Arriving at the present, the subject re-
verses the procedure, and the antecedent steps are fitted
into the causal nexus as means to the end. If the setting
up of the end be included, the finalistic nexus is seen to
be a threefold process. The steps are:
1. The setting up of the end by the subject, an o-
verleaping of the time-process, an anticipation on-
ly possible to consciousness and a taking of one's
stand regardless of the order of time.
2. The return determination (distinctive of the
finalistic process) of the means by the end, be-
ginning with the means nearest to the end and so
backward to the first means—the present one
—
which is close to the subject...
3. The actualization of the end, its real attain-
18. ETH, I, 275.
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ment through the series of means
,
wherein the re-
lation of means and end which was reversed in the
backward process is changed into a straightforward
continuous relation of cause and effect. -*9
From this analysis of the finalistlc nexus it is evident
that the causal nexus is presupposed in it.
Although only the third and last step of the finalistlc
nexus is in accord with the processes of the causal nexus-,
the success of the entire venture depends upon it. The pre-
vious step, the tracing of the antecedent means from end to
beginning, can only be useful if the effect of each of these
antecedents can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy,
and such prediction is possible only in a causally determin-
ed world.
The intervention of any entity which pursues ends
in the world in which it exists is only possible
in a world causally determined .. .In a world with-
out ],aw and determinism, where everything was by
chance, an agent who pursued ends could not hold
his own at all. 20
This is a reiteration of the basic categorial law. The low-
er causal determination is a prerequisite for the successful
effective operation of the higher, finalistlc determination.
The finalistlc nexus must always be woven Into the existing
causal nexus. For this reason it is no cause for despair to
learn that man, as an ontological being, is thoroughly deter-
mined. It is only by his participation in the causal nexus
that the Ought becomes an Is, that values are realized and
19. ETH, I, 276.
20. ETH, I, 277.
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become determinant in the real world.
3. Value Realization and Personality
Values are dependent upon the subject for becoming:
principles of the real. Unless such a real entity discerns
them and commits itself to making: them effective in its
world, they must remain unrealized and merely potential real
principles. There is another aspect to this relationship-,
however. The subject is equally dependent upon the mediating
relationship if it is to attain cosmic significance and real-
ize its own potential.
Ontologically regarded, "man in comparison with the
whole is a speck of dust, an ephemeral, a negligible phenom-
enon." 2 ^- If ontological determination were the only force
operative, man would remain cosmically insignificant. But,
by his active commitment to values, man proclaims the pres-
ence of another cosmic force, axiological or finalistic
determination. This determination receives its dynamic from
the attraction of values and moves discerning subjects to
purposive activity in behalf of the possible real embodiment
of the values discerned. This activity interposes itself in
the ontological process, using its indifferent might to at-
tain value-determined ends. As the means by which the onto-
logical and axiological determinations are integrated, man
21. STH, I, 243.
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thus acquires stature in the cosmos
,
in this his insignificance is overborne .. .Man
,
a
vanishing point in the universe, is still in his
own way stronger that it: he is the vehicle of a
higher principle, he is the creator of a reality
which possesses significance and value^ he trans-
mits to the real world a higher worth. 2-2
In his role as agent for a higher principle, the presence of
which in the real world is significant, man, too, is signif-
icant .
Seen here, in true perspective, man is neither the cen-
ter nor the end of the universe. His true place and value
is found in his unique ability to discern values and strive
for their realization.
It gives him a dignity of a peculiar kind-person-
ality—which is as much a categorial novelty as it
is a valuational mark. A moral subject who of all
real entities stands alone en rapport with the i-
deal world of values and who alone has the meta-
physical tendency to communicate them to reality
which lacks them--only such a subject is a person. 2 ^
Man's relation to the value realm thus gives him cosmic stat-
ure and enables him to realize his potentiality as a subject,
and become a person.
According to Hartmann, there are two decisive elements
of ethical personality. Though these elements grow out of
the subject-value relationship, they are not the result of
the subject’s discernment of values nor of his activity in
their behalf. "One is this: that the values do not coerce
22. ETH, I, 243.
23. ETH, I, 266.
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the subject, but even when they are discerned, impose only a
claim upon him, while leaving him free." 2 ^ The fact that it
is in his power to accept or reject the obligation attaching
to values he has discerned, that he can say "no" to great
metaphysical powers gives the subject a kind of equality with
them. Because of this volitional freedom, he is an independ-
ent factor in the cosmic process, an unpredictable factor
that must be reckoned with in determining the ultimate con-
sequences of the process.
"The second element of personality is found in the val-
uational marks which the subject retains in his acts."
These marks are not the same as the ends for which the sub-
ject acts, but are by-products of such activity, inhering in
the subject himself rather than in the end. These marks of
ethical personality
,
developed in the subject as a result of
his disposition
,
will, and action, to bring about the reali-
zation of values, are moral values. Their development,
structure, and place in the system of values will be the sub-
ject of a later chapter. It is sufficient for the present
to recognize that they develop out of the subject-value re-
lationship .
However different these values may be from those
which constitute the matter of the will and the
content of the ends, they stand in the closest
relation with them; for exactly that conduct has
moral value which is a commitment of the person to
24. ETH, I, 266.
25. ETH, I, 266-267.
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ends directed and selected by the moral feeling
for values
In his rejection or acceptance of values, and in the quality
of his efforts to realize them, the subject is a carrier of
value and disvalue, of good and evil, of moral value.
Thus the two elements of personality are closely inter-
related with each other and with the realization of value.
In these relations is seen the real significance of the ideal
subsistence of values for man. "Only through the intrusion
of values as determining powers into his actional sphere does
the subject become that which he morally is, a person.
"
2 ^
He is one real existent among many in the realm of Being,
ontologically determined. If the values which he serves
were mere "inventions", entirely subjective, then it would
be as if he sought to free himself by pulling on his own
bootstraps. If these values were derived from experience in
and of the ontological realm, then they would be existential
laws as binding as those of the causal nexus, leaving the
subject no freedom. But by hearing and heeding the "call of
the ideal"
,
by discerning values and striving to make them
real in his own world, man is freed from determination by
that world. Declaring his allegiance to the value realm,
while retaining his real residence, he becomes a person.
This participation in two worlds is the condition of
26. ETH, I, 267.
27. ETH, I, 268.
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personality, as well as of freedom. The person is
an ontological and an axiological entity, a real
self-existing being, and at the same time possess-
ing in himself the higher, the distinctively moral
values or their opposites .. .This is the reason why
man's moral nature, his personality, can never be
determined simply from
is axiological as well.
Man is a real being with a knowledge of and participation
in non-real, ideal principles. Working with and for values,
man sees his axiological nature, his
morally super-empirical essence, his inner deter-
mination, his Idea, to be his own proper self. In
accordance with it, he tries to live, that is to
form his empirical being.
This inner determination, superimposed upon causal determin-
ation, in accordance with the basic categorial law, gives
man moral autonomy and he becomes his own proper self, a
personality. Thus values, while using man for their own re-
alization, are in turn the means to man's self-realization.
tlge ontological nature, but
28. ETH, I, 269-270.
29. ETH, I, 199.
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CHAPTER III
MORAL VALUES
1. General Aspects of Moral Values
As the discussion turns from the consideration of the
nature of the value realm and value realization to the study
of a special group of values, the moral, it is immediately
evident that not ail values involved in the moral phenomena
are moral values. Man as a moral being, is related to and a
product of a multitude of non-moral values. While "moral
conduct is always conduct toward persons,"-*- it is always in
connection with other kinds of values. For this reason, every-
thing which is, is also from the standpoint of ethics, either
a value or a disvalue. As it affects the development or lack
of development of desirable moral qualities, everything there-
by acquires a valuational mark.
The relation of moral to non-moral values is similar in
many ways to the relation of the various categories. In
studying that relationship, it was seen that the lower
,
stronger, more universal categories were material for the
development of higher categories which, while in a sense de-
pendent upon the lower, were free or autonomous as regards
them. Moral values also are dependent upon the lower, non-
moral values. Honesty has a moral value only because there
1. ETH, II, 24.
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are things which can be stolen. Charity is valuable because
it gives something to someone in need. In neither case, how-
ever is the moral worth of the act measured by the material
value of the non-moral good to which it is related. Never-
theless, moral value "presupposes the value of goods not in
themselves moral, and without them it could not itself
exist. This dependence of the moral upon the non-moral
values is simply a material dependence and does not affect
the autonomy of the moral values. Thus while biological or
organic values are prerequisites for the attainment of spir-
itual or moral values
,
they do not limit or determine the
quality of the values attained. It is possible for an indi-
vidual with a diseased or malformed body to attain great
strength of moral character.
Indeed, this may be carried even farther. All levels
of value, both higher and lower, possess this autonomy. Each
value is intrinsically "valuable"
,
regardless of its relation
to other values. This is particularly evident on the level
of the spiritual values where the beautiful, the noble, the
lovable, are valuable for their own sake. But the values of
life, of consciousness, of health, are equally valuable for
their own sake. While all values acquire new significance
as they are used as material for the higher values
,
this
fact must not be expanded into an axiological monism with
2. ETH, II, 25.
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the higher values determining the worth of the lower values.
The higher values cannot exist or be attained without the
existence of the lower, but the lower values are not merely
means, they are ends in themselves.
This relation of dependence and autonomy is more clear-
ly understood when it is seen that moral values are never
directly striven for, but are always by-products of the
striving. The end of loving is not to be loving, but to
bestow love upon the one loved. The end of true charity is
not to be charitable, but to help one in need.
The end of an act is a situational value; its
moral quality, on the contrary, is an actional
and thereby a personal value. Moral qualities
characterize a person’s conduct, but not the ob-
ject of the intention in which his conduct sub-
sists. According to Scheler’s phrase, they ap-
pear "on the back of the deed"
,
but not in the
goal it aims at.
5
Moral values are dependent upon situational values which are
the objects of personal action. But the moral worth of the
action itself is not determined by the worth of the end of
the action. Moral values are not the ends of action, but
qualities of the action Itself.
From this it would seem reasonable to assume that moral
values could not be determinant factors in personal conduct.
This assumption would be greatly in error, however, for con-
science, that voice of the ideal value realm, is not solely
an after-effect of conduct, but also aids in the selection
3. ETH, II, 31
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of ends. Guided by the Idea of what the self ought to be,
the conscience passes Judgment upon proposed ends, condemn-
ing those which call for action not in accord with the Idea.
Although moral worth is a quality of the striving to
realize ends, it is not strictly correct to say that moral
values cannot be striven for. One may strive to attain
moral worth in one's own personality. The activities of
churches and schools offer ample proof of this kind of en-
deavor . But
even where the end of the endeavour is really the
moral worth of a personality (one's own or anoth-
er's)
,
it is never the same as the moral worth of
the endeavor.
^
When the educator attempts to develop honesty or self-denial
in the student, his acts are not on that account to be
called either honest or self-denying. The moral worth of
such acts
,
while valuable in itself, is something other than
that which is aimed at. Thus it is necessary to include
personal values in with situational or goods values as pos-
sible objects of striving. But the moral values realized in
the striving subject will be qualities of his striving, not
the ends striven for.
The nature of man' s moral worth is such that it receives
its richest development when he gives it the least atten-
tion, and directs his attention and activities, outward. In
losing himself in the service of others, man finds his true
4. ETH, II, 36.
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self and. attains moral worth. Since moral values do not in-
here in ends, but are realized in the acts intended to real
ize the ends, two important facts stand out. First, moral
values may be realized in the subject which were not intend-
ed or striven for, and secondly, the moral worth of an act,
while a quality of the striving , does not depend upon the
successful attainment of the intended end.
This is not to imply that there is no limit to the re-
alization of moral values.
There are goods which one may indeed lose when one
has them, but cannot gain when one has never had
them, or has lost them. Of this kind are youth,
ingenuousness, harmlessness, and closely related
to those are certain forms of happiness, such as a
cheerful disposition, healthy light-heartedness,
also--up to a point--beauty
,
charm, natural grace,
and many related things.
5
While these gifts may be cultivated and developed to a cer-
tain extent, in the case of the first-mentioned examples
even this possibility does not exist.
A further limitation upon the moral values attainable
lies in the physical and psychological structure of the sub-
J ect
.
Thus for the coward by nature courage is utterly
unattainable; in its place a substitute can at
best be installed through reflection, self-control
and habit, a kind of inner discipline. 6
The same limit applies here as in the case of the Ought -to-
Do. Nothing can be done by, or expected of, the subject
5. ETH, II, 42.
6. ETH, II, 43.
..
.
,
<
. .
.
'
.
.
.
,
.
. t .
57
which he is powerless to do.
2. Problems of Gradation, System, and Unity
In speaking: of moral and non-moral values
,
ana higher
and lower values, a gradation of values nas been presupposed.
It is not possible to make any permanent classification of
values on the basis of the meager knowledge possessed at
this stage of the investigation. On the other hand, some
knowledge of the relationship of one value to another is
necessary if one is to make even the most elementary deci-
sions. In every ethical situation a multitude of values
clamor for attention and realization. Since not all can be
heeded, the subject is forced to choose which value or val-
ues he will heed. In this choosing, the subject is guided
by his consciousness of the ethical situation, setting value
against value. He is aided by the fact that with the primal
sensing of values is given also a feeling of their rela'tive
rank or grade.
Socrates was the first to realize the importance of
knowing what was good. His teaching that man will do the
good when he knows it was based on a keen insight into human
nature. Hartmann puts it thus, "it is in the nature of human
volition that it never is directed towards anything contrary
to value as such."^ All striving is toward something which
7. ETH, II, 46.
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is good, or is conceived to be good. Evil or disvalue re-
sults from a mistaken striving for the lower value when it
was possible to have striven for a higher one. Man does not
choose evil or lower values because he prefers them, but be-
cause he is confused by the clamor of the lower vaiues which
drowns out the whisper of the higher.
Even though the primal consciousness of values is at
the same time a consciousness of valuational grade, and even
if the subject were always to select the higher value, the
conflict of values would not be ended. The vastness of the
value manifold and the apparently equal worth of vaiues
qualitatively different gives strong indication of a multi-
dimensional gradation of values rather than a simple linear
arrangement
. Then if vaiues of equal rank were in conflict,
the primal consciousness of grade could not resolve the con-
flict.
Still, despite this limitation, the sense of value and
its accompanying sense of grade offers the most promising
means of access to a knowledge of the gradation prevailing
in the realm of vaiues. Many attempts have been made to
establish criteria for determining vaiuational grade, but
these have for the most part been only general outlines
,
making distinctions in grade which are practically self-evi-
dent. The finer differences of grace are not made clear in
this way, and it is just these fine discriminations which
are needed.
.'
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While the knowledge of the scale of values given by the
sense of grade is far from complete, the presentation of such
a primal intuitive discernment of relative height
proves that there is a fixed, pervading gradation
of rank, which is inseparable from the essence of
values and has the same mode of existence as they,
the same ideal self-existence.^
This fixed, objective gradation of values is unalterable by
man, even though he may mistakenly attempt to alter it by
imposing his own standard upon it.
The sense of grade, though proof of a definite fixed
gradation of values
,
cannot be used as a criterion to measure
and test the values competing in every ethical situation.
It only expresses itself as an elementary feeling of prefer-
ence in particular instances, and is detected only by the
attentive and patient. But through development and use of
it, fragmentary as its revelations may be, much can be learned
of the ideal scale of values.
It is the task of ethics to assemble, analyze, and in-
terpret the phenomena of the valuationai consciousness. It
must take the data of moralities past and present and extract
from them the truth which each of them possesses. Then all
of these insights into the value realm, contradictory or not,
must somehow be fitted into a system of values. All the
phenomena must be admitted. No false harmony is to be a-
chieved at the sacrifice of inclusiveness. While harmony is
8. ETH, II, 60.
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of course desirable, contradictory or antinomic pnenomena
are not to be omitted merely because they do not harmonize.
To find a supreme value which was the focal unity of
all values has been the goal of ethic ists ever since Plato.
This unending searcn for a supreme value has discovered two
possibilities. The supreme value
could lie in the direction of the simplest and
most elementary values, and indeed be capable of
being exhibited beyond the last; but it could also
lie in the opposite direction, in that of the most
complex and concrete, and be recognizable ueyond
these, In the first case, by the supreme value is
meant the strongest and most elementary (also the
most general), but in the second, the axiologically
highest
.
Ethical theories which seek the supreme value in the univer-
sal desires of men such as pleasure, happiness, self-preserv-
ation, are examples of the first type. Other theories which
olace love of God, or justice, or personality at the apex of
the axiological structure exemplify the latter.
There is a certain justification for both views. In-
deed it is entirely possible that both could exist as the
polar extremes of the value realm. Eut ethics must leave
this problem unanswered until the phenomena of the valua-
tional consciousness yields a great deal more information
about this realm. Pending further knowledge of the value
realm and the ultimate disclosure of its systematic struc-
ture, the multiolicity of observable values must be joined
9. ETH, II, 69.
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together in some kind of system. Any system or scale of
values based upon the fragmentary valuational knowledge now
possessed will in all probability be a temporary and unsat-
isfactory stop-gap. But because of the ever-present demand
for making moral decisions, some scale of values, even
though it is not the ideal, absolute scale, is needed.
Any system of values which may be constructed will have
as its goal the ultimate harmony of all values and the su-
premacy of one group or type of values. But this desire for
harmony and a monism of values must not be allowed to influ-
ence the investigation of ethical phenomena. The phenomena
must determine the system, not the system the phenomena.
Our view of them must be based upon their relations
to one another: the relations of subsumption and
foundation, of kinship and discrepancy, of struc-
ture and content, of height and interpenetration
of the spheres of validity. It must allow for
oppositions and conflicts as well as harmonies--
at the risk of coming upon valuational antinomies
which for the sense of value remain insoluble.-*-^
Only a system which thus includes all of the phenomena can
be a valid system. Its validity will rest upon the inclu-
sion of antinomies as well as harmonies.
Probably the most commonly observed or experienced of
these valuational antinomies is the conflict of value with
value. This conflict arises when values in a given situation
are so nearly equal in grade that the primal sense of valua-
tional grade can make no distinction between them. If the
10. ETH, II, 71.
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nature of the actional sphere is such that both values can-
not be selected, then an antinomy results which is only re-
solved by the determination of the subject.
In practice, then the values clash. For instance,
whoever places personal regard above law, gives
preference to love and violates justice, although
in themselves justice and love do not exclude each
other .
While this conflict may not exist in the ideal value realm,
it does exist for the subject because of volitional limita-
tions, and constitutes not only a problem for the subject,
but also is further proof of the multi-dimensional structure
of the value realm. Since the only basis for gradation which
Hartmann admits as valid is the preferential sense of grade,
and it is powerless to decide the conflict of value with
value, such conflict must be considered insoluble and included
as such in the system of values.
Two antinomies which are of tremendous importance for
the subject are found in the relationship of values to real-
ity. The ideal values are values which of necessity Ought-
to-Be. But when they seek to enter reality, they are opposed
by the freedom of the subject. This freedom of the subject
as regards the Ought is of value for it plays an important
part in the transformation of the subject into a person.
The ideal values are also, if realized, of value. In this
antinomy, if the subject chooses one or the other of the
11. ETH, II, 77.
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elements, freedom or commitment, to the exclusion of the
other, he destroys his personality. He must balance the
two elements if he would retain both his freedom and the
values which become his as a carrier of values.
Closely related to this antinomy is the antinomy of un-
realized and realized values. Realized values are of value,
therefore the realization of values is also a value. But if
all values were realized, there would be no unrealized values
which could serve as ends of striving. Thus the value of
realized values opposes the motivational value of unrealized
values in an irreducible conflict.
This antinomic relationship of opposites is also ex-
pressed in a variety of contrasts which Hartmann calls "re-
lational opposites". These contrasts do not require a posi-
tive choice for one or the other of their elements as in the
case with the true antinomies, but, on the contrary, are
more satisfactorily treated by merging the opposite elements
into a synthesis. Thus the tendency of the subject to dis-
sipate his energies in constant activity is opposed by a
tendency to self-preservation and inertia. Both tendencies
are valuable, for without activity, values could never be-
come realized, but without a subject that endures through
its activities, there would be nothing to act, nor anything
%
for moral values to inhere in. All motion rises upon stabil-
ity. Without it there is no motion. Thus both the striving
and the striver are valuable elements wnich can and must be
.
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retained.
Similar opposed correlatives are harmony and conflict,
grade and range. The value of the tendency to harmonize and
absorb all conflict is opposed by the value of the growth
which takes place where conflict continually stirs things up.
The value of stress upon the development of one value or
group of values is opposed to the value of developing a wide
range and variety of values
,
of participating in the rich
value manifold offered by life. In all of these opposi-
tions or contrasts, the vaj.uablenes3 of both elements is in-
contestable. Equally incontestable also, is the fact that
they are opposites and the further development of either in
the same subject, to that extent excludes the other. Though
not insoluble antinomies, these relational opposites indicate
further complications and increased complexity for the devel-
oping system of values.
Hartmann’s great genius for analysis is evident in al-
most every phase of his phenomenological study of ethics,
but in the analysis of the oppositional relationship of the
individual and the group or community, this genius is per-
haps most evident. The collective unity of individuals, the
group, community, state, or nation, is the enduring bearer of
values. It is the permanent element,
the substance, in which alone aistant goals, far-
seeing human enterprises, can be pursued. And in
so far as the individual can co-operate in these
enterprises, when at times he consciously enters into
their service... he subordinates himself and his pri-
vateends to the enterprises, he recognizes their su-
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periority ana consciously converts himself into a
means; in some cases he sacrifices his personal
existence for them. He adjusts his life as a mem-
ber organically to some grand process which passes
beyond him into the future, into the life of the
communal being in which he participates only by
contributing, not by receiving.
I
2
By this self-sacrifice, the individual clearly expresses his
recognition of the value of the on-going community. From
this recognition of the value of the community, it is no
great leap to the idea that the state or community is the
important, the valuable thing and that individuals are of
value only through their contribution to the collective unit.
Over against this extreme of collectivism, is seen the
opposite extreme of individualism. While it is recognized
that the individual must express himself in and through the
community, it must be kept in mind that the value of the
collective unit is a borrowed value. Every act of the unit
is an individual act, and the individual can only commit
himself to the will of the community when its ends are ends
which he himself values. Without the individual there would
be no community.
The culminating point of this Individualism is
that the individual just as unscrupulously credits
himself with the worth and claim of the existing
community, as the community credits itself with
the worth and claim of the individual .. .He rejects
the collective unit which is of no use, opposes it,
overthrows it. For him the community is only a
means to his own life and his own ends. 13
12. ETH, II, 107.
13. ETH, II, 112.
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Human greatness and progress is always an individual affair.
It is the individual who must develop new values, new under-
standing which can then spread to the rest of the. community.
It is from the value of the individual that the community
derives its value.
It is evident that both socialism and individualism
suffer from the tyrannical tendency of all "isms" and seek
to establish their own particular view or value as supreme.
However, it is important to recognize the truth contained in
each of the extremes.
In communal ethics the error lies on the surface.
The collective unit itself, taken by itself,
exists only in abstraction. Apart from individu-
als it has no being. , It exists only in them, for
it consists of them.
Therefore the whole must respect the worth and being of the
part, for without the part, the whole ceases to be. An
additional, axiological significance is given to the indi-
vidual because as a person, he alone can be a carrier of
moral values. Thus the part is of a higher order, axiologi-
cally speaking, than the whole.
But individualism is an equally false abstraction for
the individual is never found completely isolated from soci-
ety. He is a product of his interrelations, of the cultural
and etnical society into which he is born and in which he
participates. He has no self-existence apart from the whole.
14. ETH, II, 113.
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Here, as in previous antinomies, the solution is no
solution, but a compromise. The individual must acknowledge
the value peculiar to the collective unit as a bearer of the
mores of individuals past and present, while the collective
unit must realize that its value is a derived value and at-
taches to it only so long as it serves the ultimate end, the
individuals past, present, and future, wrno compose it.
So much for the opoositions and conflicts which compli-
cate both the construction of a system of values and moral
conduct. Hartmann has shown by his analysis of these con-
flicts that each of the conflicting elements is a value, and
must therefore be given due consideration in any valid system
of values. Since such a system must be based upon the rela-
tions of values to one another, Hartmann's next step is to
analyse these relations more closely.
3. Values Which Condition Contents
The values which condition contents are the qualities
possessed by man as a real subject and by reality as object,
which enable the former to act to realize ends
,
and the lat-
ter to provide the stage and properties necessary to the
action. Strictly speaking, these values are not moral val-
ues, but conditional values. They constitute the means by
which man may become a moral being, but on the higher levels
they are almost indistinguishable from moral values them-
selves .
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It may be said that in the whole series goods and
situations are predominant among the categorially
lower materials
,
but that they diminish toward the
higher, while conversely tne moral values increase
in the same relation and rinally attain complete
predominance
.
1 5
In this trend the transitional nature of these values is
clearly revealed, beginning with tne value of mere existence
and rising to the value of man’s unique capacity for purpos-
ive activity which is tne key to his attainment of moral
values
.
Since the first requirement of a bearer of values is to
be a real subject, life, as the basis of real subjectivity,
is the most elementary value for man, the axiological being.
Life, for him, is the basic condition of all higher moral
and spiritual development.
In this sense, vitality, vital strength, the degree
of life in man, is a value proper. It is the value
of that side of his being by which ne is deepiy
rooted in nature and is nimseif a natural entity...
the root which sustains spiritual life until it
reaches its highest elevation.
Without life there is no setting up of ends
,
no striving to
realize them, and Pence no moral value. Consequently, death
and ail other things which weaxen or destroy tnis ontological
root are disvaiues in the degree to which they lessen the
subject's attainment or moral values. Since death marxs the
cessation of ail value realization, it is the extreme of
disvaiue, but mental and physical maladjustments also consti-
15. ETH, II, 127-
16 . ETH, II, 131.
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tute a serious threat to the subject’s axiological activi-
ties. Given the care and respect due it as the basis of all
higher values, life can be directed to higher and nobler
ends. Then life, as a natural value conditioning the attain-
ment of moral values by a subject, becomes itself a moral
value
.
Possessing life, man is one with all living things.
But he is more than, different from mere living things, and
his distinction begins with consciousness. By means of it,
he becomes aware of himself and others. Consciousness, as
used here, is more than simply knowledge by understanding;
it includes intuition and other forms of experience by means
of which man's knowledge of himself and .others is increased
or affected. Indeed, the upper level of consciousness, the
awareness of values
,
is just such an intuitive discernment
of content not perceived by the understanding. With this
intuitive sense of values, man is conscious not only of
things and situations as existing, but also as valuable.
All circumstances which confront him, all situa-
tions into which he falls, come under his judg-
ments as to value and thereby attain for him sense,
meaning, importance . 17
Thus, everything presented to man’s consciousness acquires a
valuational mark. But whatever he remains unconscious of
does not exist for him either ontologic ally or axiologically.
Since his moral being is a by-product of his conscious,
17. 2TH, II, 136.
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purposive striving to realize values which are absent from
real situations, the range of values which he can realize
and the moral values which he may acquire are limited by the
extent of his conscious awareness of and participation in
real situations. Conse :uently the worth of consciousness as
a basis for moral value rises in the scale of value as it is
developed and the subject's field of conscious participation
en larged.
Life and consciousness form the ontological foundation
upon which man builds his moral being, his personality. It
was seen previously^ that Hartmann considers man's freedom
from valuational compulsion together with the moral values
inhering in him as an agent of values to be the decisive
elements of personality. But further analysis reveals the
presence of other factors, qualities of the subject, which
must be used and developed if he is to become a moral being.
The most prominent of these factors of moral being is
activity. This, however, is
not the restlessness of tendency in general .. .but
commitment, the living mobility of the ethos in
seizing the initiative and giving one's adherence,
even where it does not issue in overt action. ^9
This commitment of the subject is of value because it is
only through such activity by a real subject that values be-
come realized. But it is also of direct, personal value to
18. See Chapter II, section 3, above.
19. ETH, II, 137.
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the subject since moral value inheres in acts rather than
ends. Through intention and activity man develops his moral
being
.
In contrast to activity as a value, passivity stands as
the extreme disvalue. In this relationship, passivity is
not mere inert persistence, but is ethical and valuational
indifference, stagnation, a disinterested disregard on the
part of the subject which deadens the sense of value by its
lack of response.
Besides passivity, another opposite, suffering, stands
in apparent contrast to activity, but not as a disvalue.
There is a special value in suffering, for when one has done
all one can do, when further activity is useless or impos-
sible, then in such circumstances
where nothing apparently remains but to submit
passively, a deeper power of the moral nature in
place of ordinary activity is released, a power
which at other times is closed but which now, hav-
ing been freed, takes up the struggle for moral
existence .^0
This new power which appears in the capacity to suffer, to
endure, is hidden deep within man’s spirit, and it can only
reveal itself when nothing else avails. By means of it man
can bear suffering, can remain unbeaten despite grief or
misfortune. He finds new riches, new depths in his spirit.
He becomes conscious of values which before were hidden from
him, and his capacity for happiness and value realization is
20 . ETH, II, 139 .
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augmented, through this increased awareness of the manifold
values in the situations which confront him.
There is a limit to the value of suffering, beyond which
it becomes an extreme disvalue. The point at which this
transformation occurs is not determined by the suffering it-
self, but by the subject's capacity to bear it. But within
the limit of the subject's endurance, and increasingly so
as it aoproaches this limit, suffering is of value because
of the opportunity which it affords his spiritual powers to
ascend from the innermost depths of his being and reveal
themselves. It is not to be desired, but is embraced and
turned to advantage when it does come.
But the new spiritual powers revealed in the courageous
endurance of suffering do not exhaust its possibilities for
value realization, for the higher moral values, if not the
highest, are realized in the subject's voluntary commitment
to and striving for ends which by their very nature involve
great trials, resoonsibilities
,
and personal sacrifice.
The moral value of an action, and of commitment to ends
in the face of possible suffering, increases "with the degree
of commitment to it; and it attains its highest point when
the whole personality without reserve is surrendered to the
thing striven for." 2 -^- The value of activity and of suffer-
ing is determined by the strength of will or determination
21. STH, II, 143.
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which stands behind the intention implied or expressed in
them and furnishes them with persevering, striving power.
Without regard for the worth of the intended end, the
strength of the intention is itself a moral value, which
reaches its height in the willingness to sacrifice one's self
in one's acts.
The recognition that the degree of commitment to ends
may vary indicates the existence of a further quality of the
subject which conditions his attainment of moral being.
This further condition of personality is freedom of will and
of action. Freedom of the will is seen in the fact that the
subject chooses the values to which he will commit himself,
and he determines the degree of commitment
,
while freedom of
action is evident in his ability to strive to realize values
to which his will has committed him. The possibility of the
reality of such freedom was discussed previously^ and it
was seen then that it was this self-determination of ends
and action by the subject which enabled him to free himself
from ontological determination and rise to personality as a
moral being.
With this freedom of will and action comes the respon-
sibility for its consequences. The importance of freedom to
man is nowhere more clearly evident than in his willing ac-
ceptance of responsibility and even guilt for his own con-
22. See Chapter II, section 1, above.
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duct. Guilt, like suffering is not to be desired, but when
it comes it must be borne, for "it signifies for him the
retention of his personality, the preservation and recogni-
tion of his freedom.
"
25 it is a mark of his unique gift, a
symbol of his moral self-hood. In bearing his guilt willing-
ly, he tells the world that he is a free being. If he weak-
ens and longs, mistakenly, for deliverance from his guilt,
he proves himself unable to bear his freedom. Ethics knows
of no deliverance from guilt, but finds cause for rejoicing
in the knowledge and triumphant bearing of it.
Man, even with the qualities of consciousness, activity,
strength, and freedom would still be unable to realize values
if he did not also possess foresight. The past and the
present are unalterably determined. Only the future offers
any possibility for teleological intervention. By his abil-
ity to anticipate, to foresee, man discovers his only pos-
sible field of action, the future. Foreseeing the ends of
his striving, he is able to determine the steps necesaary to
their realization. Guided thus, he is free to commit his
will and activity to the realization of the future ends.
The final factor of personality found in the subject is
thus his conscious commitment to foreseen but unrealized ends,
his teleology. In the setting up of ends, the predetermina-
tion of means, and the guidance of the real process of events
23. ETH, II, 145.
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toward these desired ends
,
the value of this teleology is
plainly evident. By means of it he fulfills his role of
mediator between the value realm and reality, and "becomes
thereby the bearer of moral values. For it is to acts dis-
tinguished by such teleology that the qualities good and bad
pertain."-^ Thus teleology is man's greatest gift, and also
the most dangerous . Like suffering, it is of value only
within the limits of the subject's endurance. Many are
broken by the responsibility and the guilt which is theirs
by virtue of this power. But man must continue the danger-
ous game, for it is his only means to personality and cosmic
significance. By use of the teleological power which is
his and the proper care of the factors which condition it,
he can attain moral being.
The value of the above mentioned qualities of the sub-
ject is generally realized in the striving for situational
values, or goods. These values differ from the personal,
actional values just discussed in that they do not attach to
a subject, but give scope and direction to the subject's
striving. Because all striving aims at and is rendered pos-
sible by such values or goods, they deserve a place in the
ethical scale of values.
Goods belong to material and situational values,
which as objects to be striven for constitute the
basis of actional values. They are not moral, but
they are morally relevant. -5
24. ETH, II, 152.
25. ETH, II, 155.
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The basic goods value is the general situation, the
real world, in which a conscious, active subject finds him-
self together with everything in it that he can turn to his
advantage. Included in this value are all the natural condi-
tions which sustain life, each of which is thereby a value.
Of particular importance for man's teleological activities
is the causal structure prevailing in the real world. Every
finalistic act presupposes the causal nexus for its execu-
tion, hence, it is a basic conditional value for the exist-
ence of teleology and personality.
The general cosmic structure is the framework within
which man strives and develops his character.
Within the general situation occur the various
specific situations... which are valuable because
v
they first bring a man face to face with his tasks,
challenge him to commit himself and hold him to
his decisions. 26
The specific situations constitute his field of action. In
them, in the opportunity and challenge which they present,
he finds the material basis of his moral life.
It would be possible to discover many more special
classes and levels of situational or goods values. Every-
thing which can become an end for a subject has value as a
possible condition of his realization of moral value in his
own being. Even the intention of another, a moral value for
him, is a good for him to whom it is directed. Also to be
26. ETH, II, 158
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included as goods are all those things and situations which
are not directly striven for as ends
,
but are of value as
means to the ends. Thus it may be said that
in the sphere of things
,
in relations and in the
personal milieu which fill up the life of a man,
there is scarcely anything that would be absolute-
ly indifferent to him. Everything has for him its
axiological coloring, be it positive or negative. ^7
Hence the whole of reality has goods-value as the basis of
the moral good and bad in man.
4. Fundamental Moral Values
The values considered up to this point have not been
moral values, but qualities of real things and situations
which make the realization or attainment of moral values
possible. The outstanding point of difference between the
two classes of values concerns the relation of moral values
to freedom. Whatever of value and disvalue is brought about
by man’s free choice and action, comes thereby under moral
judgment. Only a free being can be blamed or praised for
his acts and intentions. Only such a being is good or bad.
Where there is no freedom, there is no morality.
In dealing with moral values, a different problem
arises than that dealt with in the investigation of the con-
ditional values. There the material or quality which con-
stituted the value was plainly revealed by analysis, and
27. ETH, II, 164
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was merely unfamiliar in its axiological dress. But here,
in the narrower sphere of moral values
,
just the opposite is
the case. Here the qualities are readily acknowledged as
valuable, but their material content becomes increasingly
difficult to distinguish, the higher the value. It there-
fore becomes necessary to seek information concerning the
content of these higher values in the details of historical
and empirical moral codes, rather than by categorial analy-
sis .
The most fundamental moral value is goodness. Systems
of morality which differ greatly in content are all agreed
in this, that what is morally valuable is good. In each
system the good has been identified with the highest value.
It has been defined as pleasure, happiness, justice, love.
To conceive of the good as the highest good or as the sum of
many lesser values or goods
,
mistakenly returns it to the
group of conditioning values, as that which can be striven
for. This misconception in regard to the nature of the good
has been at the root of appalling historical mistakes. The
good is neither good "for something" nor "for somebody". It
does not have moral value because it is either means or end.
Nor is it any more correct to speak of goodness as the
enhancement of the actional values of the person. While the
actional values or qualities which constitute the purposive
efficacy and condition the moral content of man must be re-
alized to some extent for him to be capable of moral action,
.
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they do not make him a moral being. By virtue of his pos-
session of these qualities
,
he stands on the threshold of
morality
,
but there is nothing in them which can determine
his goodness or his badness. These same qualities may con-
ceivably be used to strive for and realize either values or
anti-values. No matter how completely realized these values
may be, they still do not determine the moral value of the
subject ' s acts
.
Since all moral values, and anti-values, are by-products
of a subject's volition and action, it is evident that such
volition and action alone cannot be the determinant of the
goodness or badness of his acts. What does determine the
moral quality of his intention and action is the value or
anti-value which he intends. G-qod and bad are marks indi-
cating the direction of the subject's intentions. If he in-
tends and strives for the realization of values, he is moral-
ly good. If, on the contrary, he intends and strives to
realize anti-values, he is morally bad. It is necessary here
to permit the value of the intended situation or object, pre-
viously ruled out in determining the general nature of moral
values
,
to return as the determinant of the moral quality of
the intention and act.
Upon the intended situational va.lue alone, then,
depends the alternative between goodness and bad-
ness. What depends upon the value of the act it-
self is the height in the scale of goodness or
degree of badness.
28. ETH, II, 183.
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To clarify, moral values are values attaching to the acts of
a subject in pursuit of values as ends. The moral quality
of the act is a by-product of the striving and is independent
of the intended value. The Intended value comes in for con-
sideration, however, as the determinant of the goodness or
badness of the act or intention. Thus, while the intended
value is not Itself morally good, it forms the condition or
basis of goodness. The degree of goodness, or badness, the
height in the moral value scale of the intention and action
is determined by the degree of the subject's commitment.
Badness or evil has been defined as the pursuit of anti-
values by a subject. But it must be made clear that these
anti-values are neither ideal essences nor real situations
or objects contrary to value. They are values which become
disvalues in a given situation because the subject's choice
of them results in his rejecting higher values.
All the concrete situations of life are such that
several values are involved in them at the same
time. But the intention of the person who stands
in the situation cannot as a rule be directed to-
wards all at once... Now within such a constellation
of values
,
goodness is always the turning towards
the higher value, evil a turning towards the lower. 2 9
This does not mean that the lower value is denied or disre-
garded, but rather that it is surrendered in favor of the
higher. A keen appreciation of the value that is being sac-
rificed for the sake of the higher value serves to reveal
29. ETH, II, 185.
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more clearly the moral goodness of the choice.
Thus the two general aspects of goodness are seen to be
related to the valuational grade of the intended values.
That intention or act is good which, first, is directed to-
ward the higher value, and secondly, when this choice is
made despite strong, personal interest in the lower values
which are sacrificed.
Since the relative rank of the competing values is the
crucial factor in determining the goodness of the intention,
the importance of the value scale, and the primal feeling of
value grade which accompanies all feeling for values is
plainly evident.
As a real sense of the comparative worth of values
and as a power giving direction to the pursuit of
them... ri-his feeling for grade is the narrower
and specific basis of moral goodness in man, as
well as of the value in the intention of his acts. 30
Goodness is the objective manifestation of this awareness of
•
the ideal realm of values and the gradation which prevails
in it. Man is neither good nor bad, but builds his own
moral being by the decisions which he makes. Hence, good-
ness is a fundamental moral claim which is made upon every-
one. While more special values or higher degrees of goodness
/
may be realized by some, every person "ought" to choose the
higher values within the limits of his ethos.
In addition to goodness, Hartmann finds other moral
30. ETH, II, 190.
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values which he also regards as fundamental because as he
puts it, "they fall short of being virtues in the proper
sense and... are presupposed in the virtues." 31 These values
are nobility, richness of experience, and purity.
Nobility presupposes goodness
,
but is comparable to it
neither in content nor in extent. It is neither an intensi-
fication nor a specialization of it, but something new. It
is a special attitude which the subject introduces in the se-
lection of values. In the discussion of goodness, it was
seen that the actional limitations of the subject were such
that it was impossible for him to choose even all the values
of equal grade in a specific situation. It is this complex-
ity of valuational content, coupled with the fact that only
a few of the values can be chosen which gives scope to the
unique value of nobility.
The value selected by the subject, with due considera-
tion of the promptings of the intuitive sense of value and
grade, is usually a value which is in conformity with the
ethos of the subject's society. But the noble individual
prefers the uncommon values which are as yet unnoticed or un-
realized by society. He is the pioneer, the revolutionary,
whose devotion to uncommon values brings them to the atten-
tion of others who may then make the. realization of the un-
common value their common goal. But as soon as this happens,
31 . ETH, II, 205 .
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as soon as the uncommon has become the common, some new
value or group of values becomes the end of the noble. Thus
the noble individual and the special attitude toward values
which is nobility are always found at the growing point of
the ethos. Without the noble the process would stagnate.
His pursuit of the uncommon values is the means by which
they are tested to determine their fitness as ends to which
others may commit themselves.
Nobility imposes no universal ought as does goodness.
By its nature it can only be characteristic of relatively
few individuals. The noble individual aims at the uncommon
values with a singleness of purpose which is almost fanati-
cal and a reckless disdain of the consequences for either
himself or for other values. He pursues those values which
tend to raise a man above the common level of goodness. He
seeks the exclusive development of the values which he be-
lieves important.
Opposed to this one-sided concentration upon preferred
values, which is both the strength and weakness of nobility
as a value, is the tendency in the human ethos which seeks
the inclusion of all values in experience. While the single
minded devotion to particular values which is characteristic
of the noble is important for the development of the ethos
,
it is necessary and desirable that other values should not
be lost in the process. Hence, this tendency which seeks
breadth and diversity of value-experience, fulness of experi
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ence, is of value.
From this point of view not unity of effort is
the highest concern, but many-sidedness and diver-
sity of interest, all-round participation in val-
ues as an ideal, the ethical exploitation of life
which understands and embraces everything, and
with this also axiological richness of content and
development of personality, ethical greatness in
the sense of spacious capacity for everything that
is in itself valuable, positive breadth of valua-
tional judgment. 32
To one who seeks this fulness, participation in conflict, in
joy, suffering, success, defeat--all of life is of value.
No situation or experience is without its value for him who
is sensitive to its presence.
In this awareness of the richness of the value content
of life, the importance of the value scale fades. The lower
values too have their contribution to make. Value adheres
in fact to all the content of moral life, even to failure,
deficiency, and wrong-doing. This does not mean, however,
that what is bad becomes good. Badness is the pursuit of
dlsvalues
,
while this tendency to inclusiveness is only an
attitude of many-sided openness, of participation and appre-
ciation. It is the tendency to do inward justice to life by
appreciation of all that it has to offer.
Standing in bold contrast to this inclusiveness is
purity. Purity is the negative side of goodness. It is not
the pursuit of higher values
,
but the turning away from lower
ones. It is this fact which reveals the antinomy between
32. ETH, II, 206
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inclusiveness and purity. The tendency of inclusiveness is
to open itself to everything, while "purity bars out every-
thing which is in conflict with any value. "33 The former
seeks a fulness of moral experience while the aim of the
latter is lack of it. From the point of view of purity,
innocence is the highest good.
The pure-minded man is a living testimony to the valid-
ity of an a priori knowledge of value. He exhibits a moral
instinct whereby he may distinguish good and evil without
any experience of them. Wherever purity is met with in
human conduct, it reveals itself as sincerity, frankness,
lack of duplicity, single-mindedness in love and hate, whole-
hearted pursuit of ends. The pure-minded man reveals his
true nature and feelings in all his actions. His actions
are simple expressions of his natural impulses. He is moral-
ly unspoiled.
Because such lack of double or hidden meaning is uncom-
mon in human conduct, it bestows upon the pure-minded man a
peculiar power. Since he himself is thoroughly straight-
forward and honest, he deems all others the same, taking
them and their actions at face value. The guilty man sees
in this guilelessness his own condemnation, a symbol of what
he ought to be and is not. The mere existence of the pure-
minded man is thus a positive power for goodness
,
"a wander-
33 . ETH, II, 211.
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By him are othersing conscience for the impure mind."^
judged without any judgment on his part. Simply by his
purity, impurity stands condemned.
No merit attaches to one who has purity simply because
he has it. It differs from other moral values in that it
can neither be striven for nor actualized. It is not a by-
product of striving for other values, but is a gift. If it
is not possessed it is forever unattainable; once lost, it
cannot be regained. However, it is possible to strive to
preserve it, and the impulse to do so is the strictly moral
element in the ethos of the pure.
5. Special Moral Values or Virtues
Virtues are the values of human conduct itself, the
good connected with certain relations.
Among them the proposition holds necessarily, that
moral values are based upon situational values,
that is, that they attach to the intention which
is directed to valuable situations, and that their
specific character as compared with the latter is
nevertheless independent of the connection. 55
Although the valuational height of the virtues is not deter-
mined by their relation to the intended situational height,
their material content is distinguished by the situational
value to which they are related. But this conditioning rela-
tion fails to make clear the specific, unique characteristics
34. E'TH
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of the several virtues. Those can only be. supplied by the
living sense of values.
In the study of the virtues
,
as in that of the funda-
mental moral values
,
the values to be analysed are those
which have been prominent in the ethos of some historical
culture. Many values no less important will be overlooked
by such a procedure, but it is the best that can be done at
the present stage if one is to be guided by the phenomena
and not by one’s theories.
Here there is no question as to completeness, but
as to the quality of the manifold values, as to
the contrasting character or tne groups, the valua-
tionai relations produced, the conflict between
values, and so on. 56
The values must be taken as presented, even if thus consid-
ered they do not exhibit any great degree of unity or order.
i
Here also there is no question concerning the means by which
the virtues may be realized. That is the problem or reli-
gion. For ethics "the only question is concerning the valua-
tional quality of the single virtue itself, so far as it can
be seen and defined. "57 By analyzing those values wnich
have been raised to prominence in the developing process of
morality, something may be learned of the general structure
of the realm of values.
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a. Virtues of Antiquity
When Plato sought to determine the nature and condition
of goodness or well-being, whether of the individual or of
the state, he found four qualities to be essential. These
four qualities or virtues were wisdom, courage, temperance,
and justice. While Plato regarded justice as the crown or
sum of the other virtues, Hartmann feels that it is really
the lowest, the basic virtue which makes possible the devel-
opment of all higher ones.
The primary significance of justice is its tend-
ency to counteract the crude egoism of the individ-
ual t ..The essential feature in it is from the out-
set the idea of equality: equal rights, equal duty
with others, whether the individual or the whole
of the community, on the principle that this is
the basic condition of all communal life.^8
This is evident in the fact that justice is purely negative,
consisting of prohibitions designed to safeguard the life,
property, and freedom of each against all. In this way it
is an objective means of preserving the communal and cultur-
al values necessary for the attainment of higher values.
As a disposition of the individual to be "just" and
treat his fellow men as equals
,
to grant to all the basic
conditions for moral life and growth, justice is a moral
value. In this fact lies the moral value of all willing
obedience to laws, of good citizenship. While the objective
existence of an order of laws and law enforcement agencies
38. ETH, II, 228.
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is itself of value, .
the free commitment to the right, the inner con-
quest of contrary impulses of desire and fear, of
ambition and will to power, are as regards value
incomparably higher than all • s ituat ional vaiuea
,
which can ensue upon such commitment .39
It is this free commitment and intention on the part of the
individual which raises justice in the scale of values from
a goods-value to a virtue. It is also an indication that
the individual is aware of his belonging to and participation
in a community, where the enjoyment of basic rights and priv-
iledges involves the acceptance of responsibilities and re-
strictions
,
by each and all. As he voluntarily subordinates
himself to the good of the whole, he identifies himself with
the whole, and recognizes in its laws and demands, the laws
and demands which he as a citizen imposes upon himself as an
individual. This sense of identity with the whole on the
part of the individual citizens is the primal element in the
ethical being of a state, and wherever it is strong, the com-
munity flourishes.
As an objective or situational value justice is purely
negative. But considered as a moral quality of the individ-
ual it is seen in its positive aspect as the acceptance of
one's responsibility to establish, sustain, and improve com-
munal order and equality of opportunity in the interest of
group solidarity. The emphasis is uoon conservation of
39. ETH, II, 233.
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achieved social values, at least a minimum of freedom for
all.
The meaning of wisdom, another of tne Platonic virtues,
has been distorted or lost sight of. Its main emphasis, as
interpreted today, is upon the intellectual values of truth
and knowledge. These, however, are far from its essence.
Conceived as the pursuit or possession of truth and knowledge,
it has led individuals to draw apart from practical affairs
and wrap themselves in contemplative self-indulgence in
searcn of "wisdom”
.
3uch arid inteilectualism is far removed from wisdom.
Wisdom is not found or demonstrated by withdrawal from life,
but by a sensing of the valuational richness which it con-
tains .
It is the penetration of the valuational sense in-
to life, into all discrimination, into every re-
action and action; even down to tne spontaneous
valuational responses which accompany every expe-
rience; it is the fulfilment of one's wnole ethical
Being with its points of view, the fixed and basic
attitude of the practical consequences towards
values . ^0
It is an unrefiective
,
intuitive attitude of appraisal and
awareness of values which the wise man carries into all the
relations of his life.
Wisdom as a virtue is a special kind of commitment to
life in general. It is a recognition of life's richness as
revealed by the primal sense of values and a grateful appre-
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elation for values wherever they are found. The wise man in
his understanding and appreciation of the valuational ful-
ness of life resolves in his own person the antinomy of the
range and the grade of values. He is committed to partici-
pation with understanaing and appreciation in life's rich-
ness, ever seeking a greater awareness or it.
But this commitment to participation in life’s fulness
must be sustained and supplemented by the ability to act ana
o o endure.
The wisest outlook is morally impotent unless
active energy, which is ready to cope with obsta-
cles, reinforces it, especially when one's own
life, welfare, and happiness must be risked. 41
This reinforcing energy is courage. Although it is most
conspicuous in acts of heroism, it is not confined to such
act s .
It inheres in all decisive effort, in all steadfast
perseverance, in all quietly persistent tenacity;
that is
,
wherever there is an element of adventure
in a situation, which requires personal commitment
and demands sacrifice.^2
It is the deliberate steadfast staking of one’s life upon
one's choice of values. V/ithout this courageous execution
of intended acts, the wisest commitment would be impotent and
meaningless.
But courage is not merely a matter of willingness to
stake one's life on the choices one has made. An even higher
41. ETH, II, 245*
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degree of courage is demanded of one, who because of circum-
stances, is in a position where his decisions and acts will
determine the lives of others. Then courage is the willing-
ness to bear responsibility for the consequences of one’s
acts. One who can bear such responsibility and rejoice in
it is the richer because of it.
Courage is demanded of all who would be moral. Every
situation presents its conflicts which require decisions.
Each of these takes courage, the courage to believe in one’s
decisions and to see them through. Thus even the willing-
ness to live and participate in life is courageous.
The other Platonic virtue, temperance or self-control,
is not to be understood as purely negative. It has been too
long thought of as the suppression of natural desires in re-
lation to the view of human nature as inherently evil. Such
a view is both psychologically and ethically false. The
natural desires and emotions of man are the substance of his
spiritual life, the material out of which something higher
and more worthy may be made. Without them there is no spir-
itual life. And the Ought which these affections express is
not to be condemned as the Ought of anti-values. "Every
genuine Ought is positive. It demands not destruction but
construction, the creation of the higher out of the lower."
^
Thus the positive meaning of self-control is the control
43. ETH, II, 250.
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and direction of the affections for the welfare of the whole
of which they are a part. It is not to be understood as de-
nying: or negating the natural desires, but as the possession
of sufficient power over them to give each its proper place,
to establish right proportion among them, and to so unify
and guide them that they may serve and enrichen spiritual
life rather than destroy it. It is the harmonizing of the
world of desires for the building of inner life; it is capac-
ity for inner self-direction.
As a moral value, self-control may not rank as high in
the scale as either wisdom or courage, both of which are
open to almost infinite upward development, but it is to the
individual what justice is to society, the basic condition
of higher moral and spiritual development.
The four Platonic virtues by no means exhaust the axi-
ological contribution of Greek thought. Aristotle also add-
ed much that was of merit. His theory of the golden mean
i
has been popularly understood as a theory that moderation in
all things is the ideal. Critics have been quick to point
out that this is absurd for it is one of the unique charac-
teristics of moral values that they have no upward limit but
may be augmented to an infinite degree without becoming dis-
values. Then it is evident that "nothing to excess" is not
the whole of Aristotle's theory of the mean.
The positive meaning of his theory is clearly seen
when it is realized that virtues are two-dimensional, both
*•
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real and ideal. A virtue is at one and the same time both a
mean and an extreme. In its material content, and as the
behavior of a real being, it is something real. As moral
value, it is an ideal formation independent of the real. In
the real dimension, there may be an excess or a deficiency
of material content, either of which is vice. Here the mean
is the desirable position. But in the value dimension, which
contains the extremes of good and bad, the nearer the ap-
proach to the good extreme, the more valuable the act.
Hartmann describes this relationship in spatial or ge-
ometrical terms in which the real and the ideal dimensions
are at right angles to each other. If only the real dimen-
sion were considered, virtue would be the mean between the
two extremes, excess and deficiency. But the introduction
of the value dimension bends the straight line into a parab-
ola,
for both the ontological extremes are in meaning
vices (the lower extremes)
,
while the intermediate
elements approximate to the good (the higher ex-
treme) and in a culminating point attain the status
of [virtue . This therefore is ontologically
at a point midway, but axiologically it is at the
higher point. From it the curve falls away again
towards another vice.^
While this theory is an interesting addition to axiology,
and, as used by Aristotle, revealed many virtues previously
unknown as such, its real merit lies in the fact that it is
most rewarding in the analysis of the more special values.
44. ETH, II, 255-256.
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Thus it is possible by means of Aristotle's theory to learn
something of values and the value realm which is revealed
by no other theory.
Some interesting additions are thus made to the known
values. Among these are liberality, mildness (righteous in-
dignation), magnificence (behavior befitting greatness), am-
bition (which is very close to self-control or right propor-
tions), magnanimity or self-esteem based upon genuine great-
ness. To underestimate one's worth is equally as bad as to
overestimate. The Socratic dictum: Know thyself, is supple-
mented by the additional counsel: Be and act thyself. Fur-
ther virtues are those of right attitude toward the fortune
and misfortune of others, a desire to see each get his due,
and a sense of shame because of one's conduct either before
or after one has acted.
One characteristic of all these virtues is their emo-
tional basis. In thus recognizing the positive moral value
content of the emotive sphere, Aristotle was far in advance
of his times and made a significant contribution to value
theory
b. The Christian Virtues
The ethos of antiquity underwent a considerable trans-
formation as a result of the development of Christianity
.
The old virtues were either reinterpreted in the light of
Christian teaching, or were superseded by new virtues.
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At the heart or the Christian system of virtues is
brotherly love, the interest in the welfare of otners . This
is not to be understood as love in general, but as a personal
disposition or intention to treat others as persons. It is
a loving, interested concern, an affirmative weii-wisning
for others, not because of tneir actual worth, but because
of their human potentiality. It is a spontaneous
,
unreflec-
tive intention to do good to and for another for his own
sake
.
Brotherly love goes beyond .justice in its interest in
the entire well-being of others. Y/here justice is concerned
with the equalizing and protection of surface rights, and is
primarily negative, love enters the realm of spirit, seeking
to remove any extermal conditions which might hinder the re-
alization of the possibilities contained in the person. It
is a "living sense of another's worth. . .spending itself upon
a man's total humanity, upon that in him which is capable
and worthy of life.' ,Zf ^ It is not a reaction to his momentary
condition but a spontaneous interest in him as a fellow being,
a person.
Genuine brotherly love makes possible the direct knowl-
edge of another person's ethos and ego. The emotional apri-
orism of love transcends the egocentric predicament, it
enables one to escape the solipsistic confines of one' s own
45 . ETH, II, 273 .
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consciousness and directly, intimately live and share the
experiences of another person. This does not mean an
identity of persons, but simply that the other's experience
becomes one's own. The external material content of the
experience is not, of course, included in this act. It is
only a comprehension of the spiritual and emotional conflicts
of the other person. But all real knowledge of the ethos of
another must come through such transcendent intrusion into
another' s being.
The inner disposition to place another's welfare on the
same level as one's own, to lose oneself in the interest of
others creates a stronger and more secure social bond than
does justice. When a sufficient number of persons love with
such a self-transcending love, they may determine the ulti-
mate destiny of society.
Truthfulness, as a virtue, is the intention of the per-
son to exoress what he thinks or believes, to establish an
objective agreement between the existing situation, which is
what he says or does, and his thoughts or conviction. To
fail to express one's inner thoughts and convictions, and to
deliberately express different ones
,
is to lie and to degrade
one's own personality.
Closely related to truthfulness is another virtue, reli-
ability. It is an extension of present truthfulness into
the future. It is "the capacity of a man so to promise that
the other man can be sure that the promise will be dis-
..
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charged."^ The reliable or trustworthy man is truthful in
that his promise is an expression in word or deed of his true
disposition. He is reliable in that he intends to keep his
promise even though his disposition be changed afterwards.
This capacity to predetermine his future conduct is the
mark of the morally mature man. By being true to his prom-
•
ises he establishes a bond of continuity and identity between
the self which he is today and the self he will be tomorrow.
If he is unfaithful to his promises
,
he renounces the self
which he was at the time the promise was made. Thus to be
unfaithful to one's promises is to be unfaithful to one's own
personality, for the capacity for predetermination and pur-
posive efficacy implied in a promise is the mark of man's
ethical being.
Fidelity is this trustworthiness expanded to include
not merely definite commitments of the person, but a general
disposition of stability and constancy of attitude toward
others. It is the mark of one whose sympathy, friendship,
and love, is not a fickle, transitory thing, but something
which can be depended upon.
Truthfulness and reliability as attitudes of the sub-
ject, are moral values, independent of their recognition by
others. But they may also become values for those toward
whom they are directed. This result, however, is dependent
46 . ETH, II, 287 .
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upon the attitude of those who are the objects of the truth-
ful or reliable disposition. The attitude of the object
person must be one of acceptance of the word and deed of the
subject as true or reliable.
This attitude of acceptance is faith, or trust, and is
itself a virtue of one who has the capacity for it. It is
"the capacity for co-operation."^ All human relations are
based upon it. The bond between men who trust each other is
even more fundamental than the bond of love or equality.
Without faith, no community or society can long exist. Lack
of faith in the group or in individual members of the group
is a warning signal of impending disruption of the group.
When one has faith in another, he places himself in the
other’s hands. Thus faith requires courage of the one who
has it, but it also olaces an obligation upon the one toward
whom it is directed.
Real trust is always a claim imposed upon the other
person--namely to justify the trust--but at the
same time and along with this it is a precious gift,
an honour conferred upon the person.
^
It is this obligation and honour which gives to faith its cre-
ative power, its ability to "remove mountains". There is a
tendency in man to do what is expected of him, to measure
up. Hence, within limits, to trust a man is to make him
trustworthy, while a man who is undeservedly labeled untrust-
47. ETH, II, 294.
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worthy tends to become so.
Faith, directed toward one who is unworthy of it, may
make him aware of his unworthiness and set in motion a proc-
ess of regeneration. There is something good in everyone
which can be developed if encouraged and appreciated. This
encouragement and appreciation is the office of faith. This
is the secret of its transforming power.
The virtues of the Christian ethos which have been con-
sidered thus far have been dispositions of one person to seek
to understand the inner world of another. But this tendency
can be carried too far. A.n individual has a right to some
privacy. Hence the disposition of a person to respect an-
other’s claim to'privacy, to refrain from looking into the
depths of his soul, is also, as a limit to the intrusiveness
of love and trust, a virtue. This virtue, which Hartmann
calls aloofness, is an expression of reverence for personal!-
4
ty . One who has a sense of his own worth thus shows his re-
spect for the worth of another.
The Grecian virtues, too, need a similar limit. They
tended to make the man who oossessed them complacent and
self-satisfied. The Christian ethos
,
with its recognition
of modesty and hhmility
,
virtues which were foreign to the
Greeks, provides this limit.
Modesty is "reticence in the presence of another’ s moral
worth, due to the consciousness of one’s own unworthiness . " ^9
49. ETH, II, 298.
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The modest man does not belittle himself, but rather sets
his moral standards high. No matter how much he may achieve,
there is always something to which he can look up, something
yet undone. He is modest, even when in the presence of per-
sons morally inferior to him, for he does not judge himself
%
by others, but by the ideal standard which he has set up for
himself.
Just as the consciousness of his shortcomings causes
man to be modest in relation to others, so it causes him to
be humble. Without any comparison with others, with nothing
but the consciousness of falling short of the mark, he is
aware of his own unworthiness. His humility is balanced,
however by a justifiable pride in having set for himself an
unattainable standard.
Other values may be discovered in social intercourse,
convention, and custom. Though these are not dispositional
values, they are significant as the social framework in which
higher values are developed and expressed. The separate
existing customs or conventions are never of absolute value.
What is important or valuable is that there should be some
social forms to instill social feeling and order in the in-
dividual. Thus social forms, in themselves of no great eth-
ical import, are indirectly given moral significance. Indeed,
the disposition to abide by the established conventions, to
observe the social amenities may rise to a considerable height
in the scale of values.
'4
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c. Other Special Moral Values
Man has a tendency to become absorbed in the immediate
tasks of life, to persist in being. He may be stirred into
developing in himself a greater awareness of life and its
values, and may learn self-discipline as a necessary means
to sharing in the enjoyment of these values. If sufricient-
ly stirred and challenged he may transcend the limitations
of his own self-interest and interest himself in and expend
his energy for the welfare of his neighbors. All this is
necessary to give to life its valuational fulness, to give
content to the ethos of man. But if the attention and in-
terest of man is centered upon the present, or the very near
future, it is easy for him to lose his sense of direction.
There is need here for a counterpoise, for an individual or
individuals who can anticipate the far-distant future and
dedicate themselves to its actualization. These far-distant
ideals must be discerned to give objective reference and a
sense of direction to those who may sometimes become lost
and confused in the turmoil of the present.
Man's nature is such that he wants to see the fruits of
his labor. He longs for assurance that his work is not in
vain, that he is a contributor to society. Hence it requires
great self-conquest and self-renunciation to give oneself
over to values which will not be realized now nor for years.
To be only a means, to lose oneself in the service of far-
distant ends is difficult and demands an ethos closely akin
,
103
to nobility. Yet it is just such sacrificial disposition
toward remote values which constitutes the moral value which
Nietzsche called Fernst enliebe (love of the remotest). Nie-
tzsche used this term to show how this value contrasted with
neighbor- love
,
the love of the nearest. While his denial
of the value of the latcer is a mistake, tne conflict which
he discovered is undeniable. Love of the near expends itself
upon raising the fallen, s rengthening the weak, and such a
process is a hindrance to progress toward the remote ideal.
It results at best in a leveling of mankind.
This is what love of tne remotest
,
as the ethos of
progress must disavow. It must unearth again the
principle of selection which love of the nearest
has buried. It must reinstate the worthiest, the
ethically strong, and aspiring, and favour him at
the cost of the man who is sinking.^0
Thus
,
love of the remotest must disregard the individual or
the community, for it aims at neither, but at an individual
and a community which is ideal. Whatever the cost, there
must be progress toward this ideal.
In like manner, justice conflicts with love of the re-
motest .
In the eyes of justice men are equal; and in so
far as they are not equal, they ought to be. Love
of the remotest sees the opposite: men are not
equal, and not only in nature and character, but
also ethically they are not of equal worth in
their human potent iality . 51
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Not only are men unequal, but they should be so. It is by
virtue of this inequality that the human race evolves. The
greater the disparity between men, the greater the activity
in the developmental process. Man must overcome and deny the
values for which he sacrificed his egoism, but not to return
to egoism, but to move on to a new and higher ethos. The
noble, the great, the ideal-intoxicated, must press on toward
higher ends, ignoring the claims of the immediate.
Such disregard of existing, recognized values consti-
tutes a revolution in the ethos, and is resisted by those
who are not like-minded. The prophet is considered a trai-
tor to his own day because he transfers his allegiance to the
future. This makes commitment to the far-distant even more
difficult. But it must not be given up. In consecration to
the future lies man's destiny. He has come this far led on
by ideals. Though he began in a very primitive state, he has
the potential capacity to attain the highest. Whatever ad-
vance he makes will be made by his efforts. What gives him
courage and hope is the astonishing fact that "within the
limits of actual possibility ... in the long run man always
becomes what he wills to become. "52 It is a great venture
requiring great faith, a staking of one's life on the impor-
tance of the evolving ethos of humanity. By this commitment,
one binds oneself with an unbreakable bond to the far-away
future
.
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But the ultimate value cannot be one which demands , un-
endingly
,
self-sacrifice and surrender or the axiological
process would remain empty of content. The meaning: of moral
endeavor cannot be found in more tasks, more striving. Some-
where the process must eventuate in absolute values which
are realized in the present. Such values are those which
follow.
The first of these was also named by Nietzsche who
called it Schenkende Tugend (radiant virtue) . This is the
attitude of one who is filled with spiritual riches which
he cannot keep to himself but must impart to others. The
values which the radiant spirit gives to others are not use-
ful as means to other ends, but have worth only in their own
structures. He sacrifices nothing in the giving of these
values. He simply overflows, and all who can, receive.
This virtue
has no end in view, it is the absolutely final
member among the values, a bloom, which, even
without fruit, purely in itself, is its own excuse
for being. . .Here is the valuational boundary of
creation and elaboration and at the same time of
the Ought. The highest value of life is inevita-
bly a spending of life... It is itself the final
creation, the ultimate meaning, an ethical Being
in and for itself--a kingly virtue.
^
The ultimate value, that which gives meaning to moral endeav-
or, to purposive striving, is itself purposeless. The end
of the process is in the process itself. The fulfillment,
53. ETH, II, 337.
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the end for which the process exists, the "useless" product,,
is the sheer fulness of living which by its overflow enriches
the lives of others.
Personality as a value differs from all those previously
considered in that it is not a universal value, nor even a
group value. Its claim is limited to one person only, de-
manding that he express himself in his valuations and his con-
duct. It cannot hold for even two persons for the preferenti-
al tendencies of one individual are to some degree different
from the tendencies, the ethos, of all other individuals.
Hence what is good for him, what he ought to do, is different
from what another ought to do. The only universal claim that
may be voiced concerning personality is that "everyone should
will individually and act in the spirit of his own personal
ethos . "
^
The material content of personality is different in
every man. The components which make it up are the general
values which do impose universal obligations
,
but each indi-
vidual combines them in his own way according to the values
which he selects and realizes. In his own way and according
to his own sense of values
,
every man pursues the general
values, and thereby realizes his own individual ethos.
Through the individuality which he expresses in his selection
of and commitment to values
,
he becomes unique and irreplace-
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No other one can reflect even the same values In
quite the same way. The disposition, the striving, the re-
alization of values which is his, and which constitutes his
personality, will never be duplicated.
If the system of values were one-dimensional, individu-
ality regarding values would require that each individual be
slightly better or worse than other individuals if he dif-
fered from them, for goodness, it was seen, is the preferenc
for the higher values in a given situation. In a linear
system of values, one or the other individual who made a
different choice in a given situation would be bad since he
failed to choose the highest value. But the multi-dimen-
sional structure of the value realm gives scope to individu-
al preferences. Because many values which are of equal rank
may be discerned in one situation, it is possible for dif-
ferent individuals to make differing commitments in the same
situation and yet all be equally good, each choosing the
best possible. It is left up to the person himself to make
the final selection. And here the individual may give free
play to the axiological preferences which are his. Thus the
actional limitations of the situation and the preferential
trends of the individual ethos combine to produce a unique
joint-product, the like of which has never been before, nor
will ever be again.
Personality increases and decreases in accordance with
the amount of individuation and the approximation of the
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actual person to his ideal ethos. The amount of individu-
ation increases in the direction of nobility as the indivi-
dual prefers values other than the typical ones. A greater
degree of individuation, when accompanied by a nearer ap-
proach to the individual ideal ethos
,
a greater degree of
value realization, produces a better, more meaningful per-
sonality .
The individualistic ethos of personality, like other
non-typical values, conflicts with the universal ethos. The
demand to be different, to exoress one's own unique nature
is opposed by the equalitarian ethos of justice. Here it
must be remembered that personality as perhaps the ultimate
value is based upon the other more universal values which
constitute the basis of all morality.
To be a personality without fulfilling the command-
ments of justice, truthfulness, fidelity or brother-
ly love, produces an inner displacement, a chaotic
and false morality without any ethical foundation;
such a personality operates in vain, it is a moral
swindle . 55
This is in accord with the nature of personality ‘as a moral
value which must be realized indirectly in the pursuit and
realization of other more general values. But by commitment
- to these more general values in accordance with his own val-
uational perspective, the individual may develop his own
unique value, his personality.
But personality is not completely realized until it be-
55. ETH, II, 361.
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comes a value for someone. Personality longs to be appreci-
ated and mirrored. Hence, it requires a complementary value,
personal love, in which it is fulfilled by becoming valuable
for someone.
Personal love does not accept the actual empirical self
or ethos, but sees through it to the ideal self beyond. Thus
with the eyes of love, and of fhith, a person may love one who
is morally imperfect and undeveloped. For this reason love
is called blind; it apparently fails to see the faults of the
loved one. But here, despite the reality of these faults,
it is the unloving man who is blind. Love is blind in the
sense that it does not see what is before its eyes. It sees
through by intuitive emotional insight to the ideal person-
ality. It loves the real, not for wnat it is, but for what
it might be. It builds and feeds upon faith in the potenti-
alities for higher worth sensed in the loved one, though un-
seen or unrealized.
The distinctive value of love, its virtue, is its dis-
position to trust, and to serve the one loved. Its distinc-
tive power is the capacity to awaken a response in the object
of the love. Taking the ideal self of the beloved as the
real self, the lover becomes a creative guiding will striving
to actualize this ideal. Ylhile it is never possible to
strive to realize one's own ethos, one can strive to realize
that which one beholds with the eyes of love in another.
The value which love has for its end is the moral being of the
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loved one. The one who loves, by his love, causes this be-
ing to approach and become what it is in idea and what he
believes it to be. The one who is loved is led to new
heights
,
moved to new endeavors by his desire to become what
he already is in the eyes of the one who loves him. The
power of regeneration which was seen in trust is also found
here in the power of the affirmative disoosition and faith
of love.
When the deep longing of the self to be appreciated and
understood is met, then much of suffering, pain, sorrow, and
happiness seems insignificant in comparison. The suffering
of one who loves can even be happiness, his happiness be
pain. To love is to awaken to an entire new realm of rich-
est values. New insights are given, new depths of meaning
and living are revealed. From personal love comes an under-
standing which is denied to the unloving, a deep and inward
communion which reveals to man what must otherwise remain
unknown to him. "A life of' love is a life spent in the
knowledge of what is best worth knowing, a life of participa-
tion in the highest that is in man." 56
Thus personal love gives ultimate meaning to life by
anticipating man's realization of his ideal essence. By
love, personality becomes not only in itself but for itself.
Here teleology turns back upon itself and the means becomes
the end.
56. ETH, II, 381.
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6. The Order of the Realm of Values
This analysis of moral values and their relationships,
which was begun with high hopes that it would reveal at
least the general structure of the value realm, is disap-
pointing in its results. What the survey has revealed re-
garding this structure is inadequate for the formulation of
a system or table of values. Analysis has made it possible
to discriminate the various values and responses more exact-
ly, but this is really more a matter of defining the materi-
al contents more accurately, while the distinctive charac-
•terestics of the values remain a matter of feeling. It is
true that in certain narrow groups of values some order and
gradation has been discovered, but the gaps between these
groups are too large, and the groups involved too heteroge-
neous to permit any general systematization at this incon-
clusive stage of the research. But analysis has at least
revealed the great difficulty and complexity of the problem.
It has provided "the initial orientation in the realm of
values . " 57
From this initial orientation it is evident that the
table of values, like every diversified object, has its
structural laws. By analysis of the moral values, something
of the nature of these laws has been suggested. Hartmann
says
,
57. ETH, II, 388.

In surveying the whole series of developed values
,
we can, without too great difficulty, discriminate
among them laws of six different types of connec-
tion, which fall into three groups of two laws
each. 5°
These laws are laws of stratification and foundation, laws
of opposition and complementation, and laws of valuational
height and vaiuational strength. While it is not always easy
or possible to set forth the laws clearly, these types of
regularity are clearly evident. Particularly helpful in
determining the nature of these laws is the existence of
analogous laws in other diversified realms such as that of
the categories.
The four laws of categorial stratification, that is,
recurrence, transformation, novelty, and distance between
strata, are found, with certain modifications, to be opera-
tive to some extent in the valuational realm. According to
these laws, the lower elements recur in the higher elements
as partial factors, but they remain unchanged in essence.
But the higher form of which they are a, part is always some-
thing new. This relation of higher and lower forms is not
an unbroken relation, for the forms are in strata which are
separated from one another by distinct intervals.
In the value realm, the law of recurrence retains much
of its force in the lower, goods-values
,
but almost entirely
disappears in the moral values. Here the laws of transfor-
58. ETH, II, 389.
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matlon and novelty are more evident. The autonomy of the
higher values is far more apparent than that of the higher
categorial forms. The distances between strata are greater,
particularly between the moral values proper and the vaiues
of goods and situations.
This laxity of the stratificational laws in the realm
of values is not due to any weakness on their part, but be-
cause another kina of connectional laws enter the picture.
The only one of these laws which can be clearly seen at the
present stage is that seen in the conditioning relation be-
tween gooas and situational values and moral values.
In this relation, the lower values, the goods or situ-
ational values, do not reappear as constituents of the new,
higher value. Nor is the lower value necessarily realized
in the realization of the higher. Moral value is dependent
upon the disposition rather than the consequences. Conse-
quently, the valuational height of the higher, moral value
is independent of the height of the lower conditioning value.
Thus wherever the conditioning relation occurs, there
is a break in the stratification. Below this break, in the
conditioning values of goods and situations, the laws of
stratification are determinant. Above this break, in the
strata of moral values
,
they are no longer determinant
,
but
are forced into the background by the new order represented
by the conditioning relation.
By a further analysis of the antinomic relation of val-
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ues
,
and of the Aristotelean virtues, Hartmann shows that
each of these virtues is not only a mean between two extreme
disvalues
,
but also a synthesis of two values. Thus bravery
is neither boldness nor cold foresight alone, but a synthe-
sis of both.
This has important implications for the higher moral
values such as brotherly love, justice, truthfulness, faith.
It means that each of them is to be understood as an extreme
which must be countered by another extreme. The syntheses
of extremes are apprehended by the emotional sense of values
in the lower forms of moral values, but are lacking in the
higher forms
,
or rather are not discerned in them. Even
though the synthesis of the higher values is not discovered
by the sense of values, yet this same sense of values longs
for such a synthesis. This longing, in the face of all ex-
isting antitheses, is due to the fact that in all actual con-
flicts, man's conduct must be a unity. From this fact comes
a necessary oostulate of ethics; only synthesis in the face
of antithesis, should be called virtue, since the one-sided
values are not worthy of the name. All valuational elements
taken alone are tyrannical and need to be balanced by a
counterweight. Justice, brotherly love, these and all the
other higher values can become fanatical. Only a love which
was at the aame time just, and a justice which was loving
could be an ideal virtue. Thus every value reaches its true
fulfillment only in its synthesis with all, even if this is
..
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only in Idea, and never in actuality.
This need for other values for fulfillment is not limit-
ed to values in oppositional relations. It is seen to be a
common phenomenon in the value realm. Trust is only ful-
filled in trustworthiness, personality in personal love,
bravery in the worth of the good for which one is brave.
One value requires the other for its completion, although
its moral worth is not in any way dependent upon the comple-
mentary value,
except that without the response there is not a
complete fulfilment or actualization. Here then
the conditioning relation is not something constit-
uent in the value, but only something which carries
it out and brings it to completion. To speak more
exactly, the conditioning does not affect the mor-
al value itself, but only its subjoined goods-val-
ue . 59
All that is required is that to every moral attitude of one
person there shall correspond a given attitude on the part
of the other. The complementary law is a law of adequate
reciprocity in human behavior, a need for synthesis of atti-
tude and response for the fulfillment of the meaning of val-
ues . •
The problem of gradation has been prominent thoughout
the entire analysis of values. Its importance for ethics
has become increasingly apparent, but the solution of it has
become increasingly unlikely. The investigation has revealed
a great deal about narrow groups of values
,
as was seen pre-
59. ETH, II, 439.
..
.
.
116
viously In considering the different types of valuational
relations. But each or these types and its variotis laws has
some limitation which prevents its application as a univer-
sally valid principle of gradation.
The opoositional relation offers some sort of regulari-
ty of principle when it is made clear that in every antinomy,
the synthesis of the antinomic elements is higher than the
elements united in it. Thus it might be said that,
the more complex the synthesis, the more antinomi-
cal the elements united in it, and the more firm
the fusion, so much the higher does it stand in
the order of rank .
^
This is a distinguishing mark which is universally applicable
to moral values. Still, from it alone, a comprehensive the-
ory as to the grade of values cannot be constructed, for a
second factor must be considered, that of valuational
strength.
In the reaim of the categories, the law of strength and
its corollaries, the laws of material and freedom, constitute
the basic categorial laws, the lav/s of deDendence, similar
in content to the laws of stratification. According to these
laws of dependence, the higher principles are always depend-
ent upon the lower for raw material, but have unlimited scope
above them as something new. Hence the lower principles are
the stronger. The higher principles cannot annul or alter
them, but only build upon them.
60. ETH, II, 445.
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Just as was the case with the laws of stratification,
the laws of dependence cannot be assumed to apply unchanged
in the valuational realm. The law of strength, like the law
of stratification, fades into the background as the constitu-
ent elements of the higher principles become less and less
discernible, while the lav/s of material and freedom become
increasingly evident. Eut the basic law of strength is oper-
ative, even though not easily discernible. It reveais it-
self in the scale of responses to values (approval, accept-
ance, respect, admiration, enthusiasm). Thus the strength
of a value is measured by the seriousness of offense against
it, while its height is determined by the worth of its real-
ization. Then the meaning of the categorial laws of depend-
ence, carried over into the value realm is this:
The higher value is always the more condi-
tioned, the more dependent and in this sense the
weaker; its fulfilment is conceivable only in so
far as it is raised upon the fulfilment of lower
values. But the more unconditioned, the more el-
ementary, and in this sense the stronger value is
always the lower; it is only a base for the moral
life, not a fulfilment of its meaning.
This is equivalent to saying: the most grievous
transgressions are those against the lowest values,
but the greatest moral desert attaches to the high-
est values.
While it is questionable whether this, law holds unbroken sway
through the entire value system, it may be assumed that above
and below the dividing line between goods-vaiues and: moral
values, it is valid.
61. ETH, II, 452.
*.
.
^
‘
I
118
(
This law explains the reason for man's disregard, of
higher values when lower values are lacking. When a man is
hungry in body, his soul-hunger is silenced or drowned out
by the clamor of the stronger, more elementary values for
fulfillment. Security for self and loved ones thus may out-
weigh liberty.
The validity of this law is unquestioned among the
moral values. Murder, theft, and other crimes against body
and oroperty are .felt to be the most serious moral trans-
gressions because the justice they violate is basic to so-
cial and communal life and the higher values which may be
realized in it. On the other hand, if radiant virtue or
personal love is lacking, it constitutes no radical danger
to anyone, just the higher moral content is missing.
Thus is it clearly seen that there are two equally im-
portant orders of gradation in the reaim of values, strength
and height, tending in opposite directions. Then in regard
to valuational grade, as well as contrasting values, a synthe-
sis is the ideal. Here it is a synthesis of two tendencies
or preferences, a preference for the higher vaiue, and a
preference for the stronger. The good as preference for the
higher values has another side, an obligation not to violate
the lower and stronger value.
Genuine morality must build from below up and work
incessantly at the foundation; and this the more
strenuously, the higher it builds; for the founda-
tion has so much to carry...Who wills the height
\'
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must first will the cond.it ions . °^
The fulfillment of the meaning of humanity is not found in
these conditions, but in the heights which are aspired to
and attained. But the aspiration and attainment are possible
only upon a foundation firmly laid.
62. E'TH
,
II, 461-462.
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CHAPTER IV
CRITICISM
It has been the task and purpose of this thesis up to
this point to present an appreciative exposition of Hartmann's
theory of the origin, nature, and function of value, together
with an analysis of a particular group of values in the
hope that such analysis would reveal more details about val-
ues. Now that Hartmann's view is more or less clearly set
forth, the task of evaluating it arises.
Regardless of the trend of one's own axiological think-
ing, one must feel that Hartmann's work is truly a great
contribution to axiology. Though some may not agree with all
of his conclusions, or his premises, the scholarly thorough-
ness with which his argument is presented must win universal
approval. Sidney Hook, whose philosophical views are diamet-
rically opposed in many resoects to Hartmann's, says that
although sharing neither Hartmann's metaphysics
nor his ethical philosophy
,
he feels that this
book in virtue of the detailed contributions it
makes to specidic ethical problems is the most im-
portant treatise on the subject in the present
century . --
The work is a valuable contribution to axiology and merits
close analytical study. It is not easily reaa, at times is
highly abstract, giving up its secrets only after much re-
reading and reflection. But it is so full of significant
1. Hook, Art. (1930), 161.
.*
121
content that such rereading and study is richly rewarding.
Hartmann's theory of value will be evaluated by consid-
ering the basic points of each of the expository chapters of
the thesis together with alternative views on the points in
question to determine which, if any, is the more satisfac-
tory view. By more satisfactory view is understood that
view which is the simplest account of ethical phenomena co-
herent with the phenomena of the whole of experience.
1.
Criticism of the Value Realm
In Chapter I, it was seen that, according to Hartmann:
1. Values are ideal essences subsisting independent of con-
sciousness or reality in a realm with its own order and laws
.
2. Values are known to real subjects only a priori through
an intuitive sense of value.
3 . Values exhibit a tendency to be realized. This tendency
expresses itself as an ideal Ought-to-Be attaching to every
value, realized or unrealized. When the value is unrealized,
a state of tension exists between the real and ideal spheres
which is expressed as a positive Ought-to-Be.
Hartmann postulates the ideal, subsistent realm of values
because he, like Kant, is convinced that universally valid
ethical principles must not, indeed cannot be, derived from
empirical sources, and he cannot accept the Kantian solution
of a self-legislating will.
The Kantian solution has two difficulties for Hartmann,
..
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besides its idealistic metaphysics. The first is the basic
contradiction and threat to real freedom involved in the
concept of seif-legislation. The pure will, the transcend-
ent universal part of the will, sets universal principles of
conduct which are valid for the empirical will, the will
which is influenced by the desires of the body. Now if the
empirical will is free and the subject can heed or not heed
the rational principles of the pure will, then an inconceiv-
able contradiction arises in whicu the same subject both
wills and wills-not to act in a certain way. On the other
hand, if the empirical will is not free as against the legis-
lation of the pure will, then freedom of the will, and all
experience of pride, guilt, accountability, and responsibili-
ty are delusions. Neither of these alternatives is desirable
to Hartmann.
Secondly, when Kant chose the legislation of a tran-
scendent will in preference to what he considered the only
other source of ethical principles, empirical data perceived
by the senses, he erred. ,There was another alternative
which was suggested by Plato's realm of Ideas and by the na-
ture of logical and mathematical laws. This was the realm
/
of essences. TherP the laws of ethical conduct could be
found, as objective and universal as are these other laws.
There beyond Being and not-Being, the subsistent essences
are eternal and changeless, unaffected by reality or con-
sc iousness
.
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The alternative source of universally valid ethical
principles which Hartmann posits, the realm of subslstent
essences, is a difficult concept for the person not schooled
in philosophical abstractions, and is construed as meaning-
less by many who do understand what is meant by it.
Concerning such a realm, Dewey says,
It is not possible to avoid the impression that
the idea of such a realm is simply the hypostatiz-
lng in a wholesale way of the fact that actual
existence has its own possibilities. But in any
case devotion to such remote and unattached possi-
bilities .. .becomes effective in relation to the
conduct of life only when separation of essence
from existence is cancelled; when essences are
taken to be possibilities to be embodied through
action in concrete objects of secure experience.
Nothing is to be gained by reaching the latter
through a circuitous route.
-
If ideal essences cannot influence man except as they become
ideas or are manifested in reality, then speculation concern-
ing their pre-conceptual or pre-actual nature has little, if
any, practical significance. The attempt to conceive them as
beyond reality or consciousness seems an unnecessary and
false abstraction which contributes nothing to the solution
of the problems which concern the ethicist. It would seem
that, despite his criticism and rejection of the Kantian
metaphysic, Hartmann himself has developed, in the value
rea-lm, an axiological Ding-an-3 ich. Such a realm and such a
Ding-an-Sich may exist, but until they become effective and
meaningful in the conscious and active life of man they are
just so much idle speculation.
2 . Dewey
,
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Walker criticizes Hartmann on this point, not, however,
by denying meaning to a realm of subsistents , but by ques-
tioning the use of the term value to denote such remote and
unattached essences. He says,
It is, of course, quite possible to conceive a
world of essences enjoying that same objectivity
and impersonality which seems ... essential to logi-
cal essences and the objects of mathematics .. .The
difficult point is in conceiving them as values in
such lofty self-existence. Their reality apart
from the human agent or thinker may not be diffi-
cult to grant . They may exist apart from the
moral agent...but would they, even so, be values?^
Granting the metaphysical possibility of a realm of Ideas or
essences, it is an unusual and highly questionable use of
the term value to apply it to essences in abstraction.
According to Gorley,
when we predicate value of anything, we pass from
the mere concept or essence of the thing, with its
qualities
,
to a bearing which this essence has up-
on existence. 4-
Until an essence has bearing upon existence it cannot be
called a value or valuable. Here, as in other fields of
thought, man is limited by his humanity; all his thinking,
and valuing, must be man-centered. Just as natural processes
are judged by their effect upon man’s welfare and comfort, so
concepts or essences are considered values from man's view-
point only as they effectively enter into the reality of
which he is a part.
3. Walker, Art. (1938), 46-47.
4. Sorley, MVIG, 77-
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This discussion serves to point out one very important
weakness in Hartmann's presentation. Although his entire
work on ethics is centered around values
,
and contains a de-
tailed consideration of them, both as ideal essences and as
existent in reality, he never defines the term, never tells
what makes a value a value. In view of this omission, one
has the right to supply one’s own definition if it is one
that gives a satisfactory account of the data of ethics. A
consideration of some definitions of value is thus in order.
Perry defines value as "any object of any interest...
That which is an object of interest is eo ipso invested with
value." ^ Value then is the quality of the object which
arouses the interest, affects the motor-affective life of
the subject.
Parker, while agreeing with Perry that value is relative
to the subject, i.e., to his response or interest, does not
agree that it is a quality of the object.. He says,
Things may be valuable, they are not values.
Value is always an experience, never a thing or ob-
ject... Hence we should not define value... "as any
object of any interest"
,
but rather as "any inter-
est in any object".
^
Sorley says a thing has value or
is called good not merely because it exists
,
but
in virtue of some quality or combination of qual-
ities which distinguish it, or in some relation
in which it stands to other things.
7
5. Perry, GTV
,
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6. Parker, Art. (1929), 305.
7. Sorley, MVIG, 86.
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Brightman, more in accord with Perry and Sorley than
Parker, defines value as "whatever ["experience] is actually
liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by
Q
anyone at any time." 0
In all of these definitions of value, whether value is
the object, a quality or qualities of the object, or a sub-
ject's interest or disposition toward the object, there is
agreement on at least one thing, that value is not independent
of ideal or real existence or of consciousness. As Walker
puts it, "The very conception of value seems to be character-
ized by the relation to an agent for whom the value has the
value that it has."^ Value is not an abstract ideal essence,
but an important factor in subject-object relationship in
reality. It is not independent of consciousness, but is
either produced in it or perceived by it.
Hartmann's failure to define value may be in part the
cause of the apparent ambiguity of the term as he uses it.
At times he speaks of values as the ends of action which at-
tract the subject, arousing him to commitment and activity.
At other times he seems to speak of the realized values
,
the
actual dispositions and conditions of real existents as val-
ues. While it may be Hartmann's intent to use value in this
broad sense as both the universal concept and the particular
realization of the concept, it is most confusing in view of
8. Brightman, POR, 88.
9. Walker, Art. (1938), 47.
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the distinction which axiolo,exists more commonly make between
ideals and values. Both Iino^O and Millard-^ call attention
to Hartmann's persist -nt confusion of the two terms. lino
quotes Brightman as saying, in oersonal correspondence,
When Hartmann speaks of values as essences
,
he is
speaking of what I call ideals. Every valid ideal,
indeed every concept of every sort, qua concept,
is timeles-s in the sense of having a fixed and
determinate meaning. . .But I do not regard an
ideal as a value. An ideal is a valid concept
of what would be a value if it were realized in
temporal-personal experience .. .Hence I say that
values are not fixed entities, but conscious ful-
fillments of ideals. The ideals themselves are
fixed concepts (although I may be ignorant of
what the valid fixed concept of justice is); but
values are never mere concepts. 2
This would seem a rather important distinction to make if one
is to discuss value theory intelligibly.
But Hartmann's ideal essences, even when distinguished
from their particular realizations, are not identical with
what Brightman calls ideals. Hartmann would not stop at
calling them concepts, but would place their original source
beyond consciousness and reality, which Erightman would deny.
Only when Hartmann’s essences enter into consciousness as
something that ought to be, do they coincide with Brightman'
s
ideals. Thus, even if the distinction between ideals and
values be understood, or clearly made, Hartmann's concept of
values as beyond consciousness and existence is still a ques-
tionable conclusion.
10. lino, CHE, 116-117.
11. Millard, TNHE
,
49-50.
12. lino, CHE, 116-117.

Apart from this, however, Hartmann's independent realm
of values introduces into value theory the hoary problem of
interaction. Descartes split reality into mind and matter
and then was faced with the problem of how they could affect
each other. He sought to solve it by the novel theory of
the pineal gland so delicately balanced that it could be
swayed by an idea. But his problem was simple compared to
Hartmann' s . Hartmann nas sometning beyond Being and not-
Being which somehow enters into Being and affects it. In
Hartmann's theory, Descartes' pineal gland is replaced by a
"dim consciousness" of value.
Actually, however, the consciousness of value is not an
after thought used to bridge the gap between subsistence and
existence, but is a primary ethical phenomenon, the primary
phenomenon, the observance of which prompted Hartmann to
look beyond the subject and beyond the empirical situation
for its cause. The reality of tnis underived consciousness
or sense of value really constitutes the wnole or his argu-
ment for tne objectivity of value.
This argument is based upon two aspects of the sense of
value. One is its evaluating aspect, the sense of the worth
of an object, relation, or action which accompanies every
discernment of value. This function of the sense of value
gives the subject the criterion by which, unreflect ively
,
intuitively, he knows that the object of the judgment is good
or bad, and to what degree it is either. This emotional
••
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perception of a value standard is considered a priori by
Hartmann. Without regard to any other experience, this ex-
perience of affirmation or negation is the Judge of value.
Regarding such independence of other experiences, Brightman
says
,
No truth can be said to be unqualifiedly a priori
unless it is necessarily related to all experience
in such a way that it is always valid no matter
what hapoens . . . It is possible that some truths are
universal and necessary; but this fact cannot be
known prior to experiences of thinking and observ-
ing. 1-^
The judgments of the sense of value are merely claims to
validity, and are not the ultimate pronouncement of it. The
claim of each value must be considered in the light of its
effect on the whole of the subject's experience. To permit
atomistic, unexamined, unrelated, emotional claims to deter-
mine one's conduct is to become incoherent and disorganized,
which is the antithesis of virtue.
The feeling of the value or disvalue of an act or dis-
position is of course an accepted ethical phenomenon. But
it is only a primary awareness of a possible actional al-
ternative which is thus presented for consideration by the
subject. It is what Brightman calls a value-claim. This
term expresses the fact "that accompanying every value there
is the explicit or implicit claim that the value now felt is
a true value.
After this claim has been considered in relation to other
13. Brightman, POR, 3-4.
14. Brightman, POR, 92.
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value-claims and the other facts of experience, and has been
found consistent and coherent with them, then this claim is
sustained and recognized as a true value.
A true value
,
then, is what we still value after
the testing of our empirical values by rational
norms (rational meaning logically consistent a/nd
coherent), and after the tests of analysis, prac-
tical consequences, and coherent wholeness have
been apolied to the experience.--
That relation or act or attitude is valuable which is ap-
proved after rational consideration by the subject.
It seems likely that these intuitive value-claims are
not messengers from the realm of essences, but are a priori,
that is universal and necessary, in that they are normal re-
actions of the basic psychical and phys iological nature of
man to the stimuli of a given situation. Each of these im-
pulses asserts its claim with all its strength, becoming
tyrannical if given the chance, and must be controlled and
ordered by reason in the light of the plan or end of the
whole
.
Much of the antinomical nature of the value realm which
Hartmann reveals by his analysis may be traced directly to
his acceptance of individual value- intuit ions as independent-
ly valid rather than Judging them in relation to the whole
system of value experiences . He claims that his model is
the Platonic concept of beholding Ideas. lino, however,
shows by an analysis of Platonic beholding that it is a dia-
15. Brightman, POR, 93.
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lectical process which is synoptic and rational in nature and
not the atomistic Wertgeflihl which Hartmann describes." 0
The second aspect of the sense of value which Hartmann
cites as proof of the objectivity of values is negative in
that it has to do with mistaken value- judgments and guilt.
Hartmann argues that the very fact that one can make a mis-
take in judging a value, or can feel remorse or condemnation
because of failure to realize it, is proof that there is a
fixed standard. If values were subjective, there would be
no error involved in value judgments for there would be no
standard to use as a measure. Nor would one feel condemnation
for failure to realize a value, but would rather lower the
ideal to the level attained.
This proof of valuational objectivity is similar to
Hartmann's reason for rejecting the Kantian doctrine of self-
legislation by the will. He holds that the same will which
gives the principle cannot then will-not to act in accordance
with it. But just such willing and not-willing as that
which he considers inconceivable is a far too common experi-
ence for nearly everyone. One may will to do better, to
answer letters promptly, not to let work pile up, and then
fail to do these things. One may be conscious of a better
way of living, may commit oneself to it, and then not will
the means to the end, and fall short. When what one might
have been and aspired to be is contrasted with what one is,
16. lino, CHE, 119-122.
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the truth of willing: and not-willing is evident, and the
sense of falling short of self-imposed ideals brings its own
condemnation to any person who is still morally sensitive.
The recognition of an error in valuation has no place,
logically in Hartmann's theory, for a value judgment cannot
be recognized as wrong unless it is considered in relation
to other judgments and experiences, which is precisely the
synoptic and coherent consideration which Brightman insists
must be applied to all value-claims. Thus lino says,
This argument for objectivity is a repudiation of
the aopeal to intuition alone, and is essentially
an argument based on discriminations between co-
herent and incoherent intuitions.
'
Hence, Hartmann indirectly admits the inadequacy of the
atomistic intuition, recognizing that the subject must in
some way discriminate between value-claims or be at the
mercy of every whim that ripples the waters of his conscious-
ness .
From the foregoing discussion it may now be seen that
values are not iaeal essences, independent of consciousness
and reality. It is meaningless to speak of values apart from
consciousness, at least, for values are something for a mind.
Values are produced in or perceived by conscious subjects and
apply to real relations or objects. While general types of
experience which are valued may be held as ideals
,
value al-
ways is found in particulars.
17. lino, CHE, 113.
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The intuitive sense of value is not the only means by
which value is known. It is only the primary awareness of
something: which claims to be valuable. Eut true value, is
known only through a rational examination of value-claims.
Values are those value claims which have been so tested and
found coherent with other values, other types of experience,
and the ultimate goal of the valuing subject.
The tendency of every value to be realized which Hart-
mann calls the ideal Ought-to-Be is nothing more nor less
than the claim, perfectly valid, of every natural desire to
be satisfied. Hartmann makes it quite clear that all of
these values are values
,
and only become disvalues as they
cause the subject to neglect higher values. So it is that
every natural desire presents a value-claim which must be
examined by reason and accepted and harmonized with other
claims, or rejected for the sake of the end of tne whole.
If the "methodological drapery" of the realm of values
is stripped away, together with the atomistic intuition as
sole criterion of values, what remains is the concept of
values, or more correctly, ideals as independent of the in-
dividual consciousness. This objectivity may have its basis
in the social order or in the dictates of rational thought
or experience. In addition, there is tne recognition of the
primary experience of value-claims as emotional, a dim con-
sciousness or feeling of value, together with the assertion
that every value-claim ought to be, ideally, even if
*.
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the actional limitations prevent such ideal realization.
2. Criticism of Value Realization
The significant points of Hartmann's theory of value
realization as stated in Chapter II of this thesis are as
follows
:
1. It is ontologically possible for a subject to be causally
determined and yet be free to strive to realize self-chosen
ends
.
2. Values are realized by such subjects who are, in addition,
responsive to the sense of values.
3. The subject becomes a person through the part he plays in
value realization.
Hartmann defines freedom "in the positive sense" as a
result of the addition of a new, non-causal determination to
the existing causal definition. As long as the outcome of
the conflict between the two is in doubt, man has. a choice,
is free. This definition of freedom is in harmony with the
thought of most contemporary ethic ists. Although free will
is still popularly conceived in the negative sense as freedom
from external restraint, or indeterminism, most serious
thinkers who have considered the proMem are agreed that
"indeterminism, far from being the guarantee of freedom, is
the contradiction of it. 11X0 Freedom, to have any meaning, must
18. Means, Art. (1936), 88.
*.
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be understood to be the ability of the subject to initiate a
series of events leading to a desired effect. If there is
no dependable relation between cause and efrect, any actual
achievement of ends is a matter of accident or coincidence.
Hence the causal nexus is a necessary presupposition of ef-
fective action, ethical or otherwise.
On this point, determinists and exponents of free will
(not indeterminists ) are agreed. But the determinist views
the whole of reality, including man, as an unbroken causal
nexus in which every element or event is completely deter-
mined in every detail by antecedent events or factors.
Most of the exponents of free will, Hartmann included,
agree that the causal nexus is universally determinant, that
man, like all other real subjects, is determined in his con-
duct by his hereditary physical and psychological nature, the
social environment and ethos in which nis lot is cast, past
decisions and conduct, and the limitations of the specific
situation in which he must make a choice. But tney no la that
man, by virtue of tne time-transcending power of thought,
may introduce a new determinant in the form of anticipation
of ends or ideals which are not yet realized. Whether these
ends or ideals are formulated by a transcendent reason or
discerned by an intuitive sense of values, man's awareness
of them is the key to nis freedom from the "push" of the
past, even though it may be determination by the "pull" of
tne future
.
. f
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The theory of freedom as a result of an excess or plu-
rality of determination rather than a lack of it, was the
Kantian answer to the determinism of his day. No great
cha. ges are made in it by Hartmann, or others who argue the
case for freedom today. Hartmann's real contribution is his
analysis of the relations of the categories of being, the
stronghold of determinism, finding thereby that the freedom
claimed for man was not something special, but was an example
of a type of categorial freedom commonly found wherever a
new and more complex category is developed out of a simpler,
more elemental category.
Ey this analysis, Hartmann shows that a subject may be
considered as a physical organism, and as such be determined
by the laws which are determinant for organisms. Indeed, if
the subject lives on the physical level and considers himself
an animal, he is determined by his animal nature. But it
must also be remembered that he is more than an animal by
virtue of his sensitivity to ideals and nis ability to be
determined by what is not real and hence non-causal. In so
far as he lives and acts in accordance with the determination
of this realm, the laws or explanatory principles of the
lower
,
animal level are inadequate to account for his conduct.
Just as the. mechanical formulae of inorganic na-
ture are inadequate to plant life, and the for-
mulae of plant life to the more complex life of the
animal kingdom, so other and still more complex
formulae, we hold, must be conceived as expressing
the activities of the conscious, reasoning self,
rising as it does above all these lower grades of
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being . ^9
It is quite likely that the laws or this higher, more complex
category of being will be more or less clearly understood in
time. But it is certain that the simple sequential succes-
sion of mechanical causality is not adequate to the task.
Hartmann' s argument for the ontological possibility of
freedom rests upon his categorial laws and upon the feelings
of freedom, guilt, responsibility, etc., which are definite
ethical data. This latter basis is all unverifiable
,
first-
hand experience which the deterrainist must regard as subjec-
tive illusion. But Werkmeister
,
who reaches conclusions al-
most identical with Hartmann's through a detailed study of
the methods and findings of science, points out that the
very fact that these feelings are subjective experiences,
places the burden of the proof back upon the determinist who
must give an explanation of their appearance in a subject
who is completely determined. These and kindred feelings
are all acceptable evidence of freedom until they can be
satisfactorily accounted for on deterministic grounds, since
on
they could certainly be explained by freedom.
Werkmeister goes on to point out that the scientist for-
mulates a hypothesis, deduces its consequences, verifies them
experimentally
,
and thus assumes the hypothesis to be proven
valid
.
19. Everett, MV, 350-351.
20. See Werkmeister, PS, 434-437*
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If we apply this same line of reasoning to our
problem, the situation is something like this: Our
hypothesis is that man is free. From this hypoth-
esis we derive the assertions (1) that man should
feel free; (2) that he should have a feeling of
authorship and of responsibility: (3) that he
should have a sense of guilt; (4) that moral con-
ceptions are meaningful; and (5) that standards of
conduct and norms of thinking are not empty words.
All these 'consequences' of our hypothesis we find
verified in first hand experience and in societal
living. Therefore we assert that our hypothesis
has been verified with a -high degree of probabil-
At least such argumentation restores subjective experience
to some degree of respectability as not to be lightly re-
garded, but rather seriously considered.
Regarding the categorial laws, particularly the law of
novelty or freedom, Werkmeister has more to say. He dis-
cusses the different levels of life and determination from
the "collision" type determination of simple inorganic ele-
ments to the determination by "motivation" at the human
level. He says
It is important, however, that each level of deter-
mination contains an irreducible novum and is
therefore inexplicable in terms of the levels below
it... That is to say, at each level something hap-
pens wnich is impossible at all lower levels and
which, in this sense, is free from the exclusive
and complete determination by factors of the lower
levels . 22
At the human level, this novum is seen in the fact that ideas
of things or relations can be determinant as the things or
relations themselves. Anticipated consequences, as well as
21. Werkmeister, PS, 437-438.
22. Werkmeister, PS, 440.
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antecedent causes, influence man’s conduct.
Man is free from the complete determination by
actually existing factors and forces because his
actions are also guided by ’ideals' and by his
anticipation of that which is to be, or which will
come about, as a result of the very actions so
determined. ^3
Such freedom violates no law of lower levels since it is
merely the addition of further determining factors to the
causal nexus.
Thus Hartmann has an able second for his doctrine of
freedom. Eut it must be pointed out that these arguments
have not proven freedom of the will, but only the ontologi-
cal possibility of some new kind of determination at the
human level. The freedom to reject the law of one's level,
which is freedom of the will, has no counterpart at other
levels, and is not provided by the categorial freedom. As
Stock puts it,
Professor Hartmann's candid and perspicuous argu-
ment throws new light on many dark places; yet at
the end the clouds gather and one feels that in
essentials thought still halts at the limits which
Kant marked for it, confident only that freedom is
an essential demand of the moral consciousness, and
that no valid refutation of the demand is forth-
coming.-^
But Hartmann's analysis of the problem and his deduction of
the categorial laws which lend support to his theory have
set the problem well and give the hypothesis of freedom a
high degree of probability.
23. Werkmeister, P3
,
442.
24. Stock, Rev. (1932), 476.
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Since this doctrine of freedom requires at least two
kinds of determination, Hartmann finds it necessary to re-
ject both causal and finalistic monisms. This reason alone
would, of course, be insufficient, but he justified this re-
jection on the grounds that these monisms , violate one or
more of the basic categorial laws. Causal monism denies the
law of novelty or freedom, while finalistic monism emphasizes
this law, denying the law of strength.
In this connection it may be said that it is regrettable
that Hartmann failed to consider a teleology which was not
fixed and certain, but which requires the co-operation of man
to realize its end. His attack on universal, almost pan-
theistic teleology is of course justified. But his mechan-
istic interpretation of the world, with the one exception of
an ideal-motivated human teleology, assumes too much and
leaves too much unaccounted for. It is possible, and some-
times desirable, for the ethic ist to ignore or postpone ul-
timate metaphysical problems, to accept the existence of the
world, the causal nexus, and Ils apparent conformity to human
ends, and develop an empirical ethic within the framework
given. But since Hartmann has chosen to discuss metaphysical
issues, he is open to the charges usually made against those
who give a mechanistic account of the world.
A consideration of these charges, and of the teleological
alternative is not within the scope of this thesis. Millard
deals with this problem in detail as does lino, who de-
25. Millard, TNHE
,
Chapter III.
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votes a large portion of his study of the ithlk to a consld-
eratlon of Hartmann's reasons for atheism. The thorough-
ness of these studies makes it unnecessary to consider these
problems further. Attention is called, particularly, to
lino's presentation of a theism and a teleology which Hart-
mann does not consider, but which leaves man's freedom un-
touched, in fact requires it and his voluntary co-operation
for the realization of its ends.
If it is understood that Hartmann means ideals when he
speaks of values
,
then his account of the journey of a value
from its ideality to reality is an interesting and fairly
accurate psychological account of how ideals become deter-
minant for man. If Hartmann's subsistent realm were dis-
carded, which it may well be without any great loss to the
remainder of his theory, the positive Ought-to-Be may be
understood as the ideals or ends of the group or society to
which the subject belongs, ideals he may approve but believe
impractical. When his interest in an ideal is aroused either
by his emotions or by recognition of its desirability, and
when he can by his efforts realize or aid in the realization
of the ideal, then it becomes an Ought-to-Do
.
It is at this point that Hartmann is forced to admit
the subjective element to enter his theory. The Ought, the
ideal or the value cannot compel the subject to accede to its
26. lino, CHE, Chapter III.
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demands. He may deny the obligation which he feels. As
Walker says
,
Tne man himself must be permitted to choose which
value he shall accept and... he must be permitted
to deny or refuse to follow a given value. Surely
this position comes dangerously close to saying
that in the last analysis it is the interest of
the person, his own choice of the value as a force
in his own life, which constitutes it as a value
for him in the situation.
While Hartmann would deny this conclusion, he is forced to
admit that "the attitude of the subject to the Ought is the
central point in the ethical problem.
A further subjective, or empirical element is added to
the theory by the fact that the subject is only obligated by
the Ought when he can realize its value' by his own efforts,
something which can only be empirically determined, both from
past experiences and accomplishments
,
and the conditions of
the present situation. This empirical element is also impor-
tant in connection with the second step in the finalistic
series Hartmann describes. The subject determines the means
to the anticipated end by a step-by-step return from it, as
conceived in consciousness, to the present. Certainly intu-
ition would need the support and guidance of past experience
in the causal nexus to determine the most suitaole and effi-
cient means to the end.
Thus the really important point in Hartmann's considera-
27 . Walker
,
Art .( 1938) , 48.
2o. Hartmann, ETH
,
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tion of the subject’s role in value realization is his ad-
mission of subjective and empirical factors which are neces-
sary to bring the value across the gap between the ideal and
the real realms
.
Man, by his sensitivity to ideals, imparts to reality, a
richness and meaning which it lacks without him, regardless
of one's world-view. "The amount of value or goodness which
actually exists in the world is dependent, to some extent at
least, upon the volition of man." 2 ^ If life be regarded as
a creative achievement or process which may add te the sum
and value of existence, then
our instrument for this is to be found in those
ideal anticipations of the future in which the
forward-looking side of human nature takes shape
under the guidance of a rational deliberation from
which new insight and action emerge. ^0
Man, the value-sensing, may become man, the value-realizing,
and thus a co-creator of value and existence.
According to Hartmann, man's attainment of ethical per-
sonality is a result of his freedom and his character which
is built up by the vaiuational marks which he retains in his
acts. Actually, man's freedom which comes through voluntary
commitment to ideals is the condition of personality. The
ethical personality itself, or the "character" of the subject,
is the nature of the subject which has been shaped by the
things or values to which the subject is committed. The sub-
29. Sorley, MVIG, 166.
30. Rogers, TE
,
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ject tends to become what he most desires to be. If this is
to be an animal, and his commitment is to his animal desires,
then his personality will bear the marks of animality. But
if he has committed himself to the highest and best in his
nature and society, his personality will reflect those ideals
which he pursues. Thus Hartmann has rightly defined that
which constitutes ethical personality or character. A man's
character is the objective manifestation of the principles
around which his life is organized.
3. Criticism of Moral Values
When one considers that portion of the Ethics in which
Hartmann analyzes the narrower sphere of moral values, his
true genius is apparent. His thorough analysis of the par-
ticular ethical values reveals a wealth of valuable informa-
tion concerning their content and relations, the usefulness
and validity of which does not depend upon the validity of
his theory of value.
The most important points of this analysis are:
1. Moral values are never directly striven for, but are al-
ways by-products of the striving for goods.
2. Any object which may be striven for, or quality of either
the subject or reality which makes striving possible, is thus
of value because it makes possible the attainment of moral
values
.
3. A feeling of valuational grade accompanies the primal
..
feeling of value. This is proof that the scale of values is
as fixed and unalterable as the values themselves.
4. All of the insights into the nature and gradation of
values which constitute the etnos of various historic civil-
izations must be fitted into the scale of values.
5. Goodness is the commitment of the subject to the higher
value in a given situation. The strength of his commitment
and striving determines the quality or degree of goodness of
his acts.
6. The ultimate values are radiant virtue, personality, and
personal love.
7. This analysis reveals certain structural relations or laws
of the moral value sphere and the value realm in general.
These laws are the laws of stratification and foundation, op-
position and complementation, valuation-height and valuation-
strength.
That Hartmann's ethic is an ethic of intention rather
than an ethic of consequence is evident from the point he
makes concerning the manner in which moral values are real-
ized. They appear "on the back of the deed" and are not in
the intended value. The intention of the subject determines
the morality of his action. There is no douDt that the in-
tention of the subject is one of the major factors to be con-
sidered in evaluating the world of his acts. But the conse-
quences of his acts for himself and for others also deserve
consideration. These consequences may be such as to oppose
or destroy the value of the intention. Thus, a well-meaning
..
.
.
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reformer might bring about the reforms which e thinks nec-
essary and desirable, but which might in reality be undesir-
able .
Sven if the consequences of his act prove the subject
to be mistaken in his intention, Hartmann says that this does
not determine the worth of the intention. From his ooint of
view, the important thing is to have values realized, and the
intention of the subject to realize what he mistakenly con-
ceives to be of value is itself a value. But the subject acts
in society and not in a vacuum, and his acts, however well-
meant, will affect the conduct and well-being of others.
Hence consequences cannot be ignored in assigning moral worth
to acts. The subject has an obligation to consider an the
foreseeable consequences of his acts. This must be included
in his attitude or intention if it is to Toe morally good.
Though he may consider all the foreseeable consequences,
other unforeseen consequences may appear which would make the
value he intends undesirable if realized.
Goodness, for Hartmann, is the direction of the inten-
tion to the higher value in a given situation. However, it
now appears that a good act must contain more than a good in-
/
tention. It must also contain a conviction that this act is
higher because its consequences are more desirable than
those of any other possible alternative values in the situ-
ation. All this implies that what has been said previously
concerning Hartmann's intuitive sense of value, namely that
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it is too atomistic
,
applies equally well to his criterion
of moral worth and his scale of values
.
Man, as a realizer of values
,
is axiologically superior
to things which are valuable to him as objects which may be
striven for. Personal value, situational value, or other ob-
ject may be come a "good", i. e., may be considered as of
moral value or significance because it provides the occasion
for attainment of moral value. A beautiful object has its own
value as a thing of beauty
,
but when it becomes a valued ob-
ject, it may cause the subject, to develop various personal
attitudes and habits which affect his character negatively or
positively. Thus the beautiful object is given an aaciitional
value. For the same reason the qualities of the subject,
such as consciousness, and of existence, such as situations
demanding choice, are morally significant as occasions for
altering the moral content of a subject.
In this way every kind of value is or may be re-
late! to character and conduct .. .All values--the
intellectual and aesthetic among the rest--have
also a share in moral value because they heighten
personal worth and are
,
to some extent at least
,
within the reach of personal endeavor. 5 1
It must be said ,however
,
that if this process were carried
out to its logical conclusion, all of reality would have an
ideal essence in the realm of value, which would render this
realm meaningless as such. It would merely be another name
for the realm of reality viewed as the means to personal
31. Sorley, MVIG, 165.
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value attainment.
Hartmann, of course, rejects the ilea that these condi-
tional values are valuable as means to the personal develop-
ment of the subject. Yet many of his difficulties would
disappear if he would only admit that man's axiology must be
man-centered and must be organized around man's interests.
But rather than consider the theory that all things are
valuable, at least as far as man is concerned, only to the
extent to which they contribute to the development of his
personality, his highest self-realization, Hartmann insists
that the only valid means of determining the rank of values
is by the feeling of grade which accompanies the primal
sensing of values. Here again his atomism dominates his
thought. The grade of the value is fixed regardless of the
situation, even though in the same situation what is the
highest value for one individual may be a disvalue for
another. The individual must be guided in his choices by
the feeling, of grade. This is an even more definite rejec-
tion of consequences as criteria of moral worth than that
previously given.
Hartmann cites the feeling of grade concomitant with the
sense of value as oroof of the fixity of the scale of values.
This is not however proof of his point for this feeling of
the relative rank of valuational alternatives, like the sense
of values, has its basis in the nature of the individual and
in the social environment in whic.h he matures. His preferenc
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for one alternative may be a result of the operation of nat-
ural likes and dislikes, or it may be the result of negative
or positive influence of the attitude of the groups to which
he belongs towards these alternatives. The feeling itself
is no proof of the place of the value in the whole, but it
is only one claim presented on behalf of one alternative.
No intelligent decision can be made without considering
this feeling-sponsored alternative in relation to the self
in all of its relations and aims. "One is never certain
about the greatest good in any situation until one has taken
s
tf ^50
everything into account. ^ Hartmann does attempt by his
analysis of the moral values to get beyond the atomistic in-
tuition of value by the individual. But when he tries to
assemble the results of his analysis into a synoptic whole,
he considers only the inter-relations of values and not
their relation to the whole of experience.
Hartmann's difficulty in regard to valuational grade
and valuational conflicts stems from his denial of any su-
preme purpose, either in man or in the cosmos. The nearest
he comes to this idea is when he speaks of man as being
guided in his conduct by his "morally super-empirical essence,
his inner determination, his Idea... In accordance with it,
he tries to live, that is to form his emoirical being. "33 If
Hartmann had followed through on this idea, his system would
32. Brightman, ITP
,
144.
33. Hartmann, ETH
,
I, 199.
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have been far more coherent.
The idea of a fixed scale of values has been largely re-
placed by the idea of a system of values organized around a
dominant aim or interest. When the subject of values thinks
rationally about his life, he
does also attempt to systematise his values: part-
ly deliberately, partly unconsciously, he gradu-
ally forms a dominating conception which determines
his conduct and his view of what is of greatest
worth. Under this dominant conception, he will
arrange other conceptions contributory to value in
his life, and will negative suggestions which
interfere with that value. 34
What is of primary importance is the worth of the whole, and
the elements which make it up are valued to the degree that
they supplement it better than some other possible value.
Erightman suggests as a work! g criterion of vaiuation-
al grade the following standard: "that value is, in any given
situation, the highest which contributes most to the coherent
functioning and organization of experience as a whole.’0 '
Both his view and that of Sorley, point up the glaring weak-
ness of any system or theory, such as Hartmann's, which would
establish a fixed scale of values without regard for man'
s
ultimate end or desires.
That which is permanent and universal in morality is
not found in fixed values or prescribed classes of conduct
valid in all circumstances. It is in the spirit which is
34. Sorley
,
MVIG, 52.
35* Brightman, ITP, 144.
.I
V
151
found wherever men guide their conduct by principles rather
than impulse. It is "essentially an active attitude--a
striving towards the realization or the best conceived.
Then those values which are coherent with this best may be
fitted into the system, members of it only because they con-
tribute to the realization of the best, and ranked by their
relative utility in this realization.
Hartmann’s analysis of valuational antinomies is valu-
able for its clear, detailed presentation of the various
tnesions of life. Yet many of these could be and are re-
solved in practice, by viewing them from the standpoint of an
ultimate dominant interest. Hartmann considers the possibil-
ity of such a supreme value
,
but puts it aside as not Justi-
fied by the data. The individual must construct some sort
of system of interests if he is to act effectively. The
sense of value also tends toward synthesis in every situation,
but the unresolved valuational antinomies do not Justify .the
ethicist's drawing of similar conclusions.
The conflict of value with value of which Hartmann
makes much, is a direct result of his failure to differenti-
ate between value-claims and true values, and to recognize
the organization of values around a dominant purpose. Many
of the values which seem to conflict will be recognized as
not coherent with the puroose of the self and will be ruled
36. Sorley, MVIG, 148.

out as false values. The values which still would be coher-
ent with the whole of experience and of equal value to the
end of the self then may be regarded not as disproof of
unity
,
but as providing a variety of materials which the in-
dividual chooses to add to his life in accordance with his
own individual preferences. Thus the artist, the philos-
opher, the statesman, may each realize his best- self in his
own unique way
.
Other antinomies may be similarly resolved by the sub-
ject in accordance with his own concept of the best, the
ideals and ethos of his time and place, and finally his own
individual nature.
In contrast to Hartmann's emphasis upon the opposition
and conflict of values, Brightman lays stress upon the in-
terpenetration and coalescence of values.
Each has a unique quality of its own to contribute
to the total value experience and yet each tends
to coalesce with the others.. .In fact, the fusion
and coalescence of values with each other is such
that one might be inclined to deny that there are
any separate and distinct values at all... This
line of thought points toward the conclusion that
there is really only one value, namely, the sys-
tematic whole of our value experience .77
The validity of this concept is evident from the fact that
no rational being would be satisfied with any one value if
it were stripped of all its content which comes from other
values. Surprisingly enough, in view of the important part
37* Brightman, FOR, 100-101.
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which the atomistic sense of values and valuational antin-
omies play in his presentation, Hartmann comes quite close
to a like view when he considers the unity and order which
his analysis reveals.
In the ultimate virtue or virtues, Hartmann arrives at
practically the same conclusion that others who have studied
the ethical phenomena in detail have reached. The ultimate
virtues, which are radiant virtue, personality, and personal
love, when considered as a unity, closely approximate the
concept of self-realization as the highest value. By striv-
ing for the general values in his own individual way
,
the
subject attains his personality. Radiant virtue flows from
the fulness of life that is devoted to the realization of
values. -It reveals the truth that the real meaning of life
is in life itself as a process of value realization. In the
virtue of personal love Hartmann recognizes the need of per-
sonality for appreciation. Perhaps this longing to be under-
stood, to be appreciated, is ultimately part of the reason
that man hungers for a cosmic person who will know and under-
stand his trials and who will love him with an appreciative
understanding love.
The most fruitful part of Hartmann' s study of moral
values for axiology is found in his summary of the regulari-
ties or laws revealed by his analysis. Here his peculiar
genius for analysis reveals itself, supplemented by a tend-
ency to synthesis which was lacking previously. Perhaps
.
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this is a result of the pronounced tendency of the valua-
tional conflicts to be resolved in syntheses.
The results obtained in the analysis of the stratifica-
tion and foundation relationship are nothing more than what
would be expected. The categorial laws of the sphere of be-
ing are found, interestingly enough, to be applicable to
those values wnich condition contents, or values which are
for the most part real objects and thus subject to categori-
al law. But above the conditioning relation, the purely
moral values are evidently ruled by a different kind of law.
The oppositional and complementary value relations re-
veal tendencies which offer strong support for the theory
held by Brightman,^® Everett ,
^
Sorley/^ and others that val-
ues are not independent of each other, but that they inter-
penetrate or coalesce. When the oppositional relations are
thoroughly analysed they reveal the fact that no one of the
values considered by itself is a virtue, indeed may become a
vice unless it is counterbalanced by its opposite. It is
from the syntheses of single moral values, which taken alone
are tyrannical, that virtues are produced. Thus a synthesis
of justice and brotherly love serves to remove the blindfold
from the eyes of justice and to temper it with mercy while
saving love from maudlin sentimentality. The true fulf ill-
38. Brightman, POR, 10.0-101, 104-105.
39. Everett, MV, 183-
40. Sorley, MVIG, 510-511.
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ment of any one val^e then Is in its ultimate synthesis with
all values. The same need for other values is discovered in
the complementary relations. Personality is only fulfilled
in personal love, trustworthiness in trust. Thus wisdom,
justice, brotherly-love, love of the remote, all these might
be considered as virtue-possibilities, and-on^y one who
possessed them all, plus the lower values would be considered
virtuous
.
As a result of the pronounced tendency and need for syn-
thesis, Hartmann suggests that the higher ranks belong to
the more complex syntheses. This is quite similar to Perry's
principle of inclusiveness, "the principle that a and b are
I! 4lgreater than a.
The categorial laws of dependence, considered in rela-
tion to values serve to make clear the necessity for consid-
ering the whole of value experience and not just its upper
or lower reaches. The lower values are necessary if any
higher values are to be attained, out praiseworthy moral
conduct is that in which the higher values are attained.
Hartmann still insists that the lower values do not derive
their meaning from this relation. But all values may be
viewed as valuable only in their relation to the ultimate
value, whatever that may be. If it is self-realization, then
all the values from life itself up through love of the remote
41. Perry, Art. (1931), 451.
•.
*
.
.
are valuable only as Instruments by which the realization
proceeds. But this highest value will be secure only if it
is based upon a firm foundation, and includes within itself
all the parts of which it is the whole. In this final syn-
thesis all the values are intrinsic in their identity with
the ultimate value.
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SUMMARY
1. Values, according to Hartmann, are subsistent ideal
essences independent of consciousness or reality. But values
are for a mind, are produced in or perceived by conscious
subjects, and are always conceived as existent and are found
only in particulars. When Hartmann speaks of values apart
from their particular realization, he means ideals or con-
cepts of general types of experience which are desired. But
even ideals are concepts and therefore in consciousness.
2. The intuitive, a priori sense of value which Hartmann
holds to be the only means by which values are known is only
the primary awareness of something which thus presents a
value-claim. These value-claims are accepted as true values
only after they have been examined in relation to the whole
of experience and found coherent with other values
,
other
types of experience, and the dominant purpose of the valuing
sub ject
.
3. The Ought-to-Be which attaches to every value is the
claim of every natural desire to be satisfied. Ideally, all
such desires should be satisfied, but in the individual,
some must be rejected and all must be controlled and harmon-
ized for the sake of the whole.
4. Man is causally determined as a real subject, but it
is ontologically possible for him to be "positively" free if
he is determined by a non-causal determination. Man's sensi-
tivity to ideals and values provides this determination which
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is the key to his freedom.
5. Though Hartmann hopes to piace values beyond all
subjectivity by positing the ideal realm of values, sub-
jectivity makes its re-entrance via the tneory of freedom in
regard to the Ought-to-Be of values. Only when the subject
desires a value for himself or others and can realize it by
striving is he obligated by it
,
and even then he may deny
it
.
6. Man attains ethical personality, or character, by
virtue of his freedom and the valuational marks which he re-
tains in his acts. He builds his character by striving for
values to which he has voluntarily committed himself. His
character is the objective manifestation of the principles
around which his life is organized.
7. Moral values are never directly striven for, but are
always by-products of the striving for goods. They are qual-
ities of the intention and not the intended value. But if
the intention alone is to determine the moral quality of an
act, it must unclude the consideration of all foreseeable
consequence 0 . Unforeseeable consequences do not affect the
moral quality of the act.
8. Any object which may be striven for, or any quality
of either the subject or reality which makes striving pos-
sible, is thus of value because it makes possible the attain-
ment of moral values
.
9* The feeling of va.uational grade which accompanies
..
.
.
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the primal sense of value is proof of a fixed and absolute
scale of values. This is too atomistic. The grade of values
can only be determined in relation to the dominant interest
or purpose of the valuing subject and to the whole of experi-
ence. All that is fixed in morality is the spirit which is
found wherever men guide their conduct by principles rather
than impulse. It is a striving towards the realization of
the best conceived.
10. Goodness is the commitment of the subject to the
higher value in a given situation. The strength of his com-
mitment and striving determines the quality or degree of
goodness of his acts.
11. The ultimate virtues according to Hartmann are radi-
ant virtue, personality, and personal love. These virtues,
considered as a unity, closely approximate the concept of
self-realization as the highest value.
12. Hartmann's analysis reveals certain structural laws
of the moral value sphere and the value realm in general.
These laws are: the laws of stratification and foundation,
opposition and complementation, valuational-height and valu-
ational strength. These laws reveal a tendency and a need
for synthesis of values, and the importance of both higher
and lower values, the whole of val’e experience for the high-
est possible self-realization.
..
.
•
,
.
•
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A SUMMARY OF THE VIRTUES
A. Fundamental Virtues
1. Goodness--is the preference for the higher value in a
given situation. The intention of a purposive being to
values is the only thing which as such is good or bad.
2. Nobility--is the conscious pursuit of tne uncommon
among values
,
the pursuit of those values which tend to
raise a man above the common level of goodness.
3. Richness of experience--as a virtue is the tendency to
do inward justice to life by appreciative participation in
all that it has to offer, including both good and bad.
4. Purity--is frankness
,
innocence, lack of duplicity in
conduct, word, and thought. The impulse to preserve one's
innocence by turning away from the lower values is the
moral element in purity.
B. Platonic Virtues
1. -Justice--is the disposition of the individual to grant
to all men the basic conditions for moral life and growth,
the acceptance of responsibility to sustain and improve
communal order and equality of opportunity.
2. Wisdom--is an appreciative recognition of life's rich-
ness and commitment to sensitive participation in it, ever
seeking a greater awareness of it.
3. Courage--is the deliberate, steadfast staking of one's
life upon one's choice of values and willingness to bear
responsibility for the consequences of one's acts.
4. Self-control-- is the control and direction of the af-
fections for the welfare of the whole of which they are a
part, capacity for inner self-direction.
G. Aristotelian Virtues
1. Moderation-- is keeping within limits avoiding both
emotional dullness and licentiousness.
2. Liberality in Giving-- is the mean between penuriousness
and extravagance.
3. Mildness--is the mean between easy excitability to anger
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and complete incapacity to feel wrath.
4. Magniflcence--is a virtue peculiar to one who hag
great possessions and is a mean between shabbiness and
vulgar display.
5. Ambition--is the mean between lack of ambition and an
excess of it.
6. Magnanimity-- is moral pride or self-appreciation based
upon genuine greatness and worth.
7. Giving to each his due-- is a right attitude towards
another's enjoyment or suffering in proportion to his
worthiness and desert.
8. The sense of shame--is an immature sense of value and
right and restrains one from acts of which one would be
ashamed.
D. The Christian Virtues
1. Brotherly love--is an interested concern for others be-
cause of their human potentiality, transcending justice
and placing the other's welfare upon a level with one's
own.
2. Truthfulness-- is the intention to express what one
thinks or believes.
3. Reliabi 1 ity and Fidelity--is the intention and capacity
to keep one's promises in the future regardless of one's
later desires.
4. Trust and Faith--Trust is the surrender of one's per-
sonality to another and is based upon faith in his prom-
ises. It has the miraculous power of creating a desire
in its object to live up to it.
5. Modesty--is reticence in the presence of another in
recognition of his moral worth and of one's own unworthi-
ness.
6. Humility--is consciousness of falling short of one's on
own ideals, balanced by pride in having aimed high.
7. Aloofness--is an attitude of respect for another's
personality and a refusal to Invade the privacy of his in-
nermost being even when the way is open to do so.
E. Other Virtues
..
.
—
-
.
.
-
.
.
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1. Love of the remote-- is commitment to values which can
only be realized in the distant future, even at the cost
of sacrificing: much that is near and dear. It is a great
expression of faith in the future.
2. Radiant virtue--is the attitude of one who is so filled
with spiritual riches that he must impart them to others.
It is the rich, vibrant overtone of a harmonious life.
3. Personality--as a virtue is the striving: for the best
and highest values according to one's own knowledge of
them in one's own unique way, thus bringing into being
values which none other can realize.
4. Personal love--is the disposition to trust the one
loved, to serve by making the actual self loved corres-
pond more and more closely to the ideal being revealed
by love
.
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